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ABSTRACT: 
 
Tämän tutkimuksen kohteena on David Foster Wallacen Infinite Jest (1996) -romaanin 
isähahmo, James Incandenza. Incandenzassa on merkittävää se, että hän luo elokuvan 
nimeltä ’Infinite Jest’, jonka huhutaan olevan niin viihdyttävä, että se ajaa katsojansa 
toistamaan elokuvan aina kuolemaansa asti. Kyseisen elokuvan kautta tunnistan 
Incandenzan trickster-hahmoksi. Tricksterit ovat tunnettuja kansantaruista, joissa ne 
edustavat kaaosta, kontrolloimatonta luovuutta, anarkistisuutta, ja uhkaavat kontrollia 
kaikissa sen ilmenemismuodoissa. Incandenza kuvataan romaanissa myös isähahmona, 
joka kytkeytyy psykoanalyyttiseen teoriaan, jossa isän katsotaan edustavan psyykettä ja 
kulttuuria kontrolloivaa tahoa. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tarkastella, miten romaani 
kuvaa Incandenzan kautta käsitettä, jota nimitän trickster-isäksi. Tarkastelen trickster-
isää kahdella tasolla, jotka nivoutuvat toisiinsa: (1) Mikä tekee Incandenzasta trickster-
isän? (2) Miten trickster-isän vaikutukset näkyvät romaanin muiden hahmojen 
patologisessa käyttäytymisessä?  
 
Teoreettinen viitekehys koostuu trickster-teoriasta ja Lacanilaisesta psykoanalyysistä. 
Käytän tässä tutkimuksessa etenkin Helena Bassil-Morozowin teoriaa, jonka mukaan 
nyky-yhteiskunta ei pysty pitämään tricksteriä asioissa, mikä tekee siitä yhden aikamme 
määrittelevistä ilmiöistä. Psykoanalyyttinen teoriani keskittyy Slavoj Žižekin 
tulkintoihin isä-käsitteestä. Teoreettisen viitekehyksen ytimen muodostaa väittämäni, 
että trickster-hahmo on rinnastettavissa Žižekiläiseen superegoon, jonka hän määrittelee 
käskyksi rikkoa isän asettamaa lakia. Tricksterin ja superegon yhdistävä tekijä on juuri 
tämä kulttuurin rajojen rikkominen, mutta tutkimuksessani osoitan sen myös erilaisten 
psyykkisten oireilujen taustavaikuttajaksi.   
 
Analyysini osoittaa, että trickster-isällä viitataan psyykkiseen ilmiöön, jossa superegon 
käsky rikkoa isän asettama laki on omaksunut olennaisia trickster-piirteitä: merkittävin 
näistä on tuhoisa luovuus, joka synnyttää tappavan viihdyttävän elokuvan. Trickster-
isän vaikutukset romaanin muihin hahmoihin näen vangitsevina, sillä romaani kuvaa 
useiden hahmojen kohtalot peruuttamattomina umpikujina. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Psychoanalysis, Trickster, Contemporary American Literature, David 
Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest 
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1 INFINITE JEST, THE TRICKSTER, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
I focus in this study on James Incandenza, the elusive father character in David Foster 
Wallace’s novel Infinite Jest (1996), whom I see as symbolizing the trickster. The 
trickster, a common archetype in folklore and myth, is defined as a figure with a 
penchant for breaking cultural boundaries, rules, and taboos; he [sic]1 represents the 
anarchistic, the creative, and the irrational (see, for instance, Mäntymäki 2015; Hyde 
2010; Lock 2002; Hynes 1997; Radin 1972). I see Incandenza as the trickster because 
his ambiguous creative powers threaten the social stability of Wallace’s fictional 
America. Most notably, Incandenza creates a film, titled ‘Infinite Jest’, which is so 
compelling and entertaining that anyone who watches it only wants to repeat the 
viewing ad infinitum, ultimately dying of thirst or rendered insane. Incandenza’s film 
rises out of culture already obsessed with pathological behavior where professional 
sports, addiction, and even recovery from addiction are shown as sharing the same 
structure as the film. What deepens the character’s ambiguity is that he has committed 
suicide four years before the novel’s narrative present, and in the latter parts of the 
novel he appears as a ghost to haunt characters around him. I see Incandenza portrayed 
as the trickster because his ambiguity effectively problematizes the boundaries of 
culture and transgression, rationality and mad creativity, and even life and death. 
 
The trickster’s social implications have been brought up by Helena Bassil-Morozow in 
her highly original work titled The Trickster and the System: Identity and Agency in 
Contemporary Society (2015), in which she analyzes how we are tied to different 
systems by evoking the mythical figure of the trickster. Using the mythical figure as her 
guide, Bassil-Morozow (2015: 5, 7–8) pits two concepts against one another: on the one 
hand, we have the trickster, whose main purpose is to challenge the constraints laid 
upon him by society; on the other, we have the system that can ultimately mean any 
form of control from a “big and influential […] political ideology” to a “self-oppressive 
mind that stifles its own creative instincts”. But the trickster-system dichotomy is not 
black and white. Bassil-Morozow (2015: 71) observes that in contemporary societies, 
                                                 
1 Following Helen Bassil-Morozow (2015), I use the pronoun ‘he’ as a genderless substitution to refer to 
the trickster, which helps me evade cumbersome sentences.    
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“the trickster is framed in such a way that the system does not prevent it from 
expressing itself.” The system is, in other words, not equipped to keep the trickster 
completely in check. Bassil-Morozow (2015: 82) insists that when the system can no 
longer structure our social existence, all kinds of tricksters escape to taunt us with their 
chaotic presence. Bassil-Morozow’s perceptive analysis blurs the line between the 
trickster and the system, making it possible to identify the trickster’s overpowering 
effects as a form of imprisonment. I intend to use this analytic paradigm as a blueprint 
to analyze how James Incandenza is depicted as a trickster in Infinite Jest. 
 
The focus of my study being a father character, Slavoj Žižek’s development of the 
psychoanalytic concept of the Father forms the theoretical framework of this study, 
making my approach to the trickster a Lacanian2 one. Stemming from the Oedipus 
complex theorized by Sigmund Freud, the Father is seen in Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory as a figure who connotes oppression, prohibition, authority, and normalization; 
his function is to separate the child from a symbiotic relationship with the mother and 
then introduce the child into the social world (Homer: 2004: 53). Žižek (2006: 80) 
complicates this view of the Father by claiming that the concept also has a dark 
underside, which he calls the superego, an obscene agency that bombards us with 
relentless, insatiable commands to “Enjoy!”, to transgress the boarders maintained by 
the prohibitive Father. The term enjoyment3 is something very specific in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis: while pleasure is controlled by the Father, enjoyment is an excess of 
pleasure that in fact brings more pain than pleasure (Lacan 1992: 228; Žižek 2006: 79), 
as when we fall in love, which can be agonizing but also makes us feel more present 
and more alive (Dean 2006: 4). What follows from the superego’s command to enjoy is 
that it renders enjoyment a duty, something we must experience, instead of something 
we may experience (Žižek 2008 [2001]: 124), thus rendering enjoyment a duty we can 
never fully satisfy. The Father is, therefore, not merely an oppressor and normalizer, but 
has an obscene double who commands us to go beyond those boundaries in order to 
                                                 
2 Jacques Lacan (1901–1981), the father of Lacanian psychoanalysis, was a French psychoanalyst who 
reformulated Sigmund Freud’s theories in a controversial and highly challenging way. Slavoj Žižek 
(1949–) is a well-known popularizer, commentator, and developer of Lacan’s complex ideas.  
3 Following Žižek and Dean (2006), I use the Anglicized term ‘enjoyment’ instead of the original French 
jouissance. 
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experience the unendurable yet fascinating pain of enjoyment. This creates a theoretical 
paradox where the figure who stands for prohibition also stands for transgressing this 
prohibition, and I argue that the trickster is an important figure in how this dynamic is 
represented in Infinite Jest. 
 
I see a strong link between Bassil-Morozow’s trickster theory and Žižek’s interpretation 
of the two Fathers. In his book The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political 
Economy (1999), Žižek argues that in contemporary Western cultures the power of the 
prohibitive Father is in demise, which can be detected as a distrust in, for instance, 
Religion and Tradition as forces that define our social coexistence. Thus, the concept of 
the Father corresponds with Bassil-Morozow’s use of the system, both standing for the 
structuring and normalizing effects of Culture. Furthermore, Žižek and Bassil-Morozow 
share the idea that this structure is weakened in contemporary society. While Bassil-
Morozow (2015: 70, 82) sees our weakening trust in the system as freeing the trickster 
to dominate our cultural landscape, Žižek (1999: 451) sees the disintegration of the 
prohibitive Father as giving rise to a fierce, intensified superego. I see the trickster and 
the superego as functioning as if on the same level, stemming from the collapse of the 
system/prohibitive Father. The two theorists also share the view that the human psyche 
needs protection from this overpowering agency, be it the trickster (Bassil-Morozow 
2015: 86) or the superego (Žižek 1999: 440), making it necessary to find alternative 
ways for creating structure and fending off the all-consuming powers of the forces that 
threaten us. In this thesis, I use these overlapping theories in order to analyze how 
James Incandenza functions as a trickster and how his effects are portrayed in the other 
characters of Infinite Jest.   
 
What my study of James Incandenza, Infinite Jest’s father character, aims to show is 
that he is portrayed a superego figure whose psychic agency imprisons its subjects 
according to the irrational, chaotic, and anti-structural logic of a trickster, thus rendering 
him what I call the trickster-father. Moreover, the various forms of pathological 
behavior depicted in the novel, including obsessively ambitious tennis training, drug 
addiction, and even recovery from addiction, are all seen as stemming from this 
imprisoning agency, as reactions to his impossible command to enjoy, a command that 
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functions according to the trickster’s operational mode. The study is conducted on two 
interlocking levels: Firstly, I look at how Incandenza’s portrayal evokes the concepts of 
the trickster and the Father, followed by an analysis of how this portrayal produces what 
I have termed the trickster-father. Secondly, I analyze how the effects of the trickster-
father are reflected in the depiction of the pathological behaviors of the novel’s other 
characters. The conclusion I reach in the analysis is that the trickster-father is an force 
behind imprisonment, which I see as the most prominent motif in Infinite Jest. 
 
 
1.1 Material 
 
Infinite Jest (hereafter referred to as IJ followed by the page number) is David Foster 
Wallace’s4 second novel, which has become notorious for its length (a massive 1079 
pages) and unconventional use of endnotes as a narrative device. The novel’s setting is a 
futuristic America that has merged with Canada and Mexico to create The Organization 
of North American Nations (ONAN). The calendric years in ONAN have been 
subsidized by annually varying companies, with most of the novel’s events occurring 
during the “Year of The Depend Adult Undergarment.” Though Wallace’s ONAN has 
elements to it that are close to dystopian science fiction, it is essentially an embellished 
view of America in the mid-90s. The novel takes place in a fictional area in Boston 
called Enfield and has two central settings: Enfield Tennis Academy, a school for 
promising tennis players, and Ennet House, a halfway facility for recovering addicts. 
These two institutions form the background for the themes of the novel, which include 
those of finding ones way through a cultural landscape that has been pathologized by 
addiction and ambition. 
 
                                                 
4 David Foster Wallace was born in 1962 in Ithaca, New York but spent most of his childhood in 
Champaign, Illinois. He was born to a pair of academics, his mother being a grammarian and his farther a 
philosophy professor. Wallace would inherit both of his parents’ academic interests by majoring in both 
English and philosophy at Amherst College. As an undergraduate at Amherst he was diagnosed with 
depression, a condition he would struggle with all his life. He committed suicide in 2008 after trying to 
quit the antidepressant he had been on for most of his life. (For further information on the author, see 
Max 2012) 
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James Incandenza, the trickster-father, is the founder of Enfield Tennis Academy and an 
experimental filmmaker. He commits suicide four years before the novel’s narrative 
present. I begin chapter 4 by presenting how Incandenza fails to perform the function of 
the prohibitive Father in a scene with his eldest son Orin. What further deepens the 
failure of the Father’s authority is a scene in which Incandenza uses disguise as a way to 
communicate with his son Hal, whom he cannot hear speak. Despite disguise subtly 
connecting the living Incandenza to the trickster, it is after his suicide that the effects of 
the trickster-father take hold. Incandenza commits suicide while he is making the lethal 
film called ‘Infinite Jest’, which is rumored to be so compelling that anyone who starts 
watching it is caught in a repetitive loop. It is through this film that I find the link to 
trickster theory most prominent: the film is the product of mad creativity so powerful 
that the character ends up killing himself. I see Incandenza’s film as standing for the 
trickster’s penchant for crossing boundaries and transgressing norms, with its effects 
being catastrophic for whomever watches it. On the other hand, Incandenza’s film is 
also recognized as being reflected in the different forms of pathologies in which the 
novel’s characters find themselves trapped. Furthermore, in explaining how this 
character operates as the trickster-father, I use psychoanalysis to analyze these trickster 
motifs and attributes that are manifested in the character, where Incandenza’s trickster-
like presence can be seen as issuing a command to enjoy, to transgress the boundaries 
that help to keep pleasure within capacities our minds can manage.  
 
Furthermore, I recognize the trickster-father as a presence looming behind the 
pathological behaviors of the novel’s other characters. I recognize three different forms 
of pathological behavior, which also form the subsections of my analysis. Firstly, I 
discuss the phenomenon I call obeying the trickster-father’s command, which manifests 
itself in the novel as obsessive ambition. Ambition is most fully depicted through the 
students at Enfield Tennis Academy (ETA) most notably, Hal Incandenza, the youngest 
son of the late James Incandenza. Hal is a 17-year-old precocious student at the tennis 
academy, where he is the second-best player in his age group. He also has a startling 
grasp of the Oxford English Dictionary and language usage. Linguistic mastery is 
indeed presented as the way Hal relates to the world around him. Though Hal is initially 
shown in the novel as a promising young man, we find that he feels empty, merely a 
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shell trying to please other people with his achievements. The effects of Hal’s feelings 
are depicted through his gradually losing control of his facial expressions, which the 
novel presents as a symbol for the self. Another ETA student I analyze is Ortho Stice, a 
minor character, and relevant in one crucial passage where Hal finds him leaning with 
his face against a window in the hallway at the tennis academy. After a while, it turns 
out that Stice’s face is frozen stuck to the window, but they cannot remove it even by 
force, connoting the pathological underside of obsessive ambition. The tennis students 
define themselves through this idealized construction, this unattainable “best self,” and I 
see this yearning for fame as stemming from the trickster-father’s command to enjoy, to 
pursue one’s potential to the fullest, even to the disturbing extreme as the examples of 
Hal and Ortho show. 
 
Secondly, I analyze attempts at evading the trickster-father’s command. In this 
subsection, the novel’s representation of addiction recovery is recognized as a 
possibility for liberation, a way to find a substitute for the system that would ease the 
pressure of the trickster-father’s command. Most crucially, I analyze Don Gately, an 
oral narcotics addict, who has been sober for over a year and attends AA meetings and 
works as a live-in staffer at Ennet House, where his role is to help the new residents in 
the difficult steps toward full recovery. As I show below, Gately’s ability to remain 
sober leans on inventing a vague Higher Power to whose power one submits, the help of 
other addicts, and a commitment to banal cliché’s. I see the Blind Faith needed for 
sobriety to work as presenting an alternative system with the potential to liberate from 
the trickster-father’s commands. Moreover, Hal is addicted to smoking marijuana, and 
has developed a propensity for using the drug alone and in secret. The narrative portrays 
the final days of Hal as a drug user followed by his early attempts at staying sober, 
which are a continuation of his need to be perfect, and identifying with the idealized 
version of himself. Hal’s first group meeting turns out to be an Inner Infant meeting 
instead of relating to addiction. What the passage shows is that Hal is so attached to 
maintaining the appearance of a successful young man that he cannot make the leap of 
faith the novel shows as the only way to remain sober, and the only way potentially to 
fend off the trickster-father’s effects.  
11 
 
Finally, I analyze the novel’s depiction of enclosure inside the trickster-father’s loop, 
which stems from an inability to communicate, mainly through speech. Gately is shot 
and hospitalized in the middle of the novel and when the narrative returns to him, the 
reader finds him in the hospital bed, unable to speak because he is intubated. He suffers 
horrible pain because the bullet he was shot with was contaminated. During these pages, 
and though unable to speak, Gately struggles to remain sober by refusing the painkillers 
he is offered to relieve the unbearable pain. This part of the novel concentrates mostly 
on Gately’s flowing thoughts, and has a nightmarish tone to it. One of these nightmarish 
visitations is Incandenza, who appears as the wraith, communicating, eerily, as if 
through Gately’s mind. I argue that these sections show Gately facing the trickster-
father trying to tempt him into consuming drugs again. Furthermore, I find Hal in a 
similar state in the first scene of the novel (though chronologically the final one), in 
which he confronts an admission board at the University of Arizona. What the reader 
finds out during this scene is that Hal is unable to communicate to the board. I see this 
scene as showing Hal’s complete inclusion in his self as his final way to conform with 
the trickster-father’s command. The novel thus begins and ends with a character unable 
to speak and at the complete mercy of the trickster-father, thus making imprisonment its 
most prominent motif. 
 
 
1.2 Previous Criticism 
 
Overall, the psychoanalytic implications of James Incandenza have been largely 
overlooked, which seems odd for a novel that features, as is already implied by the 
title’s nod to Hamlet, a dead father coming back to haunt his literal and figurative 
offspring, themselves a group of characters crippled by addiction and pathological 
behavior. Mary K. Holland (2014: 84–85) draws attention to Incandenza’s failure to 
successfully instill the power of the father, and that a kind of “patricidal liberation” 
takes place in the form of his suicide. Though her seeing Incandenza as failing at 
instilling the father’s prohibition is a very valuable observation for my study, it becomes 
clear in the pages that follow that the prospect of “patricidal liberation” is far from 
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accounting for the effects of his failures. The trickster-father is, as I have already 
pointed out and elaborate on below, an agency of imprisonment, not liberation. 
 
Psychoanalytic implications not focusing on Incandenza have, nonetheless, garnered 
some previous attention, mostly focusing on the novel’s depiction of a culture in a state 
of infantile passivity. Marshall Boswell (2003: 131) has claimed that the novel parodies 
Lacanian theory in that all its characters are depicted as infants, as children needing 
instant satisfaction. Holland (2014: 63) observes that the characters of Infinite Jest 
struggle with the infantalizing effects of a culture whose “members [...] desire pleasure 
[...] over all else.” In her study, the form of control is characterized as a “narcissistic 
loop,” which the characters try to brave in different ways, though ultimately finding 
themselves back in the loop (Holland 2014: 77). Holland’s interpretation is, therefore, 
rather pessimistic and bleak for she does not see the novel as portraying any substantial 
way out of the loop she finds controlling its characters. Though I do not focus on the 
theme of narcissism, I share Holland’s pessimistic interpretation of the novel because it 
corresponds with my argument that the trickster-father stands for imprisonment. 
Though, rather than concentrating on the characters in the loop, I will consider 
Incandenza as an agency sustaining the loop itself.  
 
I also wish to mention two additional studies that influenced the formation of this thesis. 
Firstly, James M. Mellard’s (2010) article “Unimaginable Acts Imagined. Fathers, 
Family Myth, and the Postmodern Crisis of Paternal Authority in Toni Morrison's Love” 
has shown me how Žižek’s conceptualization of the concept of the Father can be used to 
analyze social and psychological phenomena as portrayed through rich and complex 
father characters. Secondly, Robin Mookerjee’s book Transgressive Fiction. The New 
Satiric Tradition (2013) introduced me to how the trickster figure can be seen as 
functioning in contemporary literature, whom he sees as an agent serving the satiric and 
anarchic purposes of the tradition he calls “transgressive fiction,” a literary approach 
that highlights filth, violence, drugs, psychosis, and various deviant behavior in order to 
satirize contemporary culture. Though Infinite Jest can very well be called a work of 
transgressive fiction, my use of the trickster in this thesis does not address its satiric or 
anarchistic potentials because the focus is on the psychological effects of the 
13 
 
overpowering trickster-father. On the other hand, analyzing different manifestations of 
the trickster in works of transgressive fiction could be a fruitful topic for further studies. 
 
Before moving on to presenting my theoretical framework, some overt limitations of 
this study need to be briefly mentioned. Firstly, the present study is exclusively 
concerned with male characters, which is why the gender aspect of the Oedipus 
complex is overlooked. Secondly, the mother of psychoanalytic theory will be 
overshadowed by that of the father. Though this study could benefit from a thorough 
consideration of the novel’s depiction of maternity, it has been left out in order to fully 
concentrate on the depiction of the father. 
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2 THE TRICKSTER, THE SYSTEM, AND RAGNARÖK 
 
This chapter is devoted to the trickster. I begin by presenting an outline of this mythic 
figure by investigating different definitions. I particularly focus on the trickster as a 
deceiver, a boundary-crosser, and a metaphor for change. Then I discuss the trickster’s 
role within what Bassil-Morozow (2015) calls the system. I conclude this chapter by 
examining common motifs in trickster stories, which include being trapped, creativity 
and creationism, shapeshifting, and the trickster’s ultimate dissolution. The following 
pages will show that the trickster is not a mere oddity prevalent in ancient stories, but a 
psychological presence whose influence should not be overlooked when analyzing 
cultural phenomena.   
 
 
2.1 Defining the Trickster 
 
As a mythic figure, the trickster can be found in all corners of the world. We can catch 
him in ancient Greece to China and Japan, from West Africa, and among North 
American Indians and African-Americans (Radin 1972: xxiii; Hyde 2010: 9). In 
contemporary culture, one finds the trickster for instance in the outrageously comic film 
portrayals of Jim Carey in Mask (1994) and Dumb and Dumber (1994) or Sacha Baron 
Cohen in Borat (2006) and Bruno (2009), in the anarchistic performances of Pussy Riot, 
and the subversive behavior of Lisbeth Salander in Stieg Larsson’s Millennium Trilogy 
(see Bassil-Morozow 2012, 2015; Mäntymäki 2015). The trickster being so widespread 
and popular denotes that he stands for something so universal it seems to transcend the 
limits of time and place. As I will clarify in this chapter, the trickster stands for 
freedom, change, and a disrespect for authority, rules, taboos, and structures. Even 
though these qualities figure universally in the trickster, he should not be taken as a 
figure solely outside of time and place. Radin (1972: xxiv) points out that to fully 
understand the trickster, we need to place him in the specific cultural and social context 
in which he emerges. This is an important claim since, despite his rebellious antics, the 
trickster is not an arbitrary entity but plays with the taboos and social constraints of the 
dominant culture.  
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Defining the trickster is a problematic task because what encapsulates him is ambiguity: 
he always seems to slip away the moment we think we have exhausted all his possible 
implications. William J. Hynes (1997: 33) emphasizes this argument by claiming that 
the trickster resists definition because “to define (de-finis) is to draw borders around 
phenomena, and tricksters seem amazingly resistant to such capture.” Furthermore, 
Hynes (1997: 34) maintains that “the trickster appears on the edge or just beyond 
existing borders, classifications, and categories.” The trickster, therefore, resists being 
reduced to a concept, while Hynes acknowledges that the trickster is nonetheless there, 
an eerie presence in our attempts to make sense of him. The trickster’s ambiguity is 
emphasized also by Radin (1972: xxiii), who writes that the figure is  
 
at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes 
others and who is always duped himself. […] At all times he is constrained to 
behave as he does from impulses over which he has no control. He knows neither 
good nor evil yet he is responsible for both. 
 
The trickster is, thus, an oxymoronic figure, which is evident in Radin’s use of 
oppositions. In a similar vein, Claude Levi-Strauss (1963: 224) suggests that the 
trickster is an anomaly that inhabits the extremes of binary opposites. But how is one to 
approach something that so readily defies conceptualization? One conceivable way is to 
observe what happens in trickster narratives and sketch a picture based on his actions 
rather than a preexisting essence. 
 
Firstly, the trickster cycle of the North American Winnebago tribe begins with the 
figure posing as a tribal chief, and arranging a feast before going on the warpath. The 
trickster-as-chief suddenly disappears from the feast and is found having intercourse 
with a woman. These actions break strict social rules of the Winnebago tribe. Firstly, 
the chief should always be the last one to leave a feast he gives. Secondly, the men of 
the tribe are never to have sexual intercourse before leaving for war. Thirdly, the 
Winnebago tribal chief himself is never to join his tribe in war. (Radin 1972: 4–5, 54.) 
This passage is a typical example of how the trickster can mock authority. By 
pretending to be a tribal chief he defames what is socially expected from a tribe’s 
leader.  
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Secondly, and in a grander scale, we have Loki, a trickster in Norse folklore. Loki 
schemes in order to kill Baldr, a god whose life is protected by an oath exacted by his 
mother. Disguised as a woman, Loki questions Baldr’s mother concerning the oath, and 
finds out that there is a mistletoe that was not included in the oath. He eventually kills 
Baldr with a dart made from the mistletoe. As a result of his deed, Loki is captured and 
tied under a poisonous snake, whose burning venom drips on his face. After being 
bound for torture, what follows is the prophesied apocalypse, also known as Ragnarök, 
on the course of which all the gods will die. (Bassil-Morozow 2012: 25; Hyde 2010: 
101–102). As a contrast to the obscene defamations of the Winnebago trickster, Loki 
attacks the holiest of Norse gods, though he himself suffers from it. By keeping these 
examples in mind, I move on to inspect different attempts at defining the trickster’s 
irreverent doings in more detail.  
 
The obvious yet crucial characteristic the trickster possesses is a penchant for deception: 
as his name implies, the trickster performs tricks. We can see this in the Winnebago 
trickster who poses as a tribal chief, but the trickster’s deceptions are not limited to his 
posing as something he is not. The trickster is ready to deceive everyone and anyone 
whom he encounters with tricks that “derive from [his] being simply an unconscious 
numbskull, or, at other times, from being a malicious spoiler” (Hynes 1997: 35). To put 
it another way, the trickster’s mischiefs do not have to be premeditated, meaning that he 
can stumble into situations and act irrationally without underlying intentions. On the 
other hand, he can also have a more conscious mindset, as with Loki and Hermes who 
both use deception cleverly to defy the higher gods that keep them constrained (for a 
detailed analysis of Hermes, see Hyde 2010). Moreover, these mischiefs can build up so 
much energy that even the trickster himself cannot control their force, making him 
possibly a “trickster-tricked,” which is the case with Loki being bound and the looming 
Ragnarök (Hynes 1997: 35; see also Radin 1972: xxiii). The trickster’s deceptions can 
result in falling upon his own head, which is what happens with Incandenza’s lethally 
entertaining film: he creates something so deeply tuned into the human psyche that he 
cannot take it himself either. It can also be argued that by threatening to destroy 
Wallace’s fictional society, the film functions in setting in motion a Ragnarök-like 
apocalypse. 
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Deception and trickery are linked to a further characteristic used to define this figure: he 
is a boundary-crosser. Hynes (1997: 34) maintains that for the trickster 
 
[n]o borders are sacrosanct, be they religious, cultural, linguistic, epistemological, 
or metaphysical. Breaking down division lines, the trickster characteristically 
moves swiftly and impulsively back and forth across all borders with virtual 
impunity. 
 
The Winnebago trickster crosses boundaries of social acceptability by acting in a way 
that is out of the question for a tribal chief, but he crosses boundaries even more 
outrageous when, later in the cycle, he transforms into a woman and marries the son of 
a tribal chief (Radin 1972: 22–23). The trickster can, therefore, move freely from being 
a figure of patriarchal authority to being the wife of one; here he undermines the 
boundaries created by gender roles and the sanctity of marriage. According to Robin 
Mookerjee (2013: 11–12), the trickster is, indeed, someone who defies socially 
sanctioned narratives in favor of unsanctioned ones, where borders of decency are 
undermined. Loki killing Baldr is an extreme example of how detrimental tricksters are 
to figures of authority. The trickster does not fight for what is held acceptable, normal, 
or even within the boundaries of the physically possible. He is, instead, detrimental to 
the very institutions that keep these boundaries in place and give them their social 
sanction.  
 
In her analysis of the social implications of the trickster, Helena Bassil-Morozow (2015: 
7–8) defines the trickster as a metaphor for “the psycho-anthropological idea of change, 
an impulse that challenges the existing order of things, a progressive force that is a-
structural and anti-structural in its nature.” We can, in other words, catch glimpses of 
the figure in instances of change, when something new is brought into our world, when 
preexisting boundaries are lifted and present to us the chance to reorganize the world 
around us. As Bassil-Morozow (2015: 15) elaborates, the trickster disrespects the 
structuring power of the dominant culture’s institutions and rules. In Infinite Jest, 
Wallace depicts characters yearning for change, wanting to live their lives without the 
pains of addiction and the passivizing standards of the culture they live in. But it is 
Incandenza who is the trickster in the novel. He creates, in a perfect trickster manner, a 
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film that functions as a symbol for the addicted culture itself. This highlights the 
trickster’s destructive potential: one can never be sure what happens when the trickster 
attacks social structures.  
 
To sum up the discussion thus far, the trickster is detrimental to the sacred and the 
official, which is already reflected by his elusive and definition-defying nature. 
Furthermore, the trickster has a penchant for deception, which he often uses to attack all 
kinds of different boundaries upheld by the dominant socio-cultural rules, taboos, and 
institutions. This brings us to the next topic, which deals with the trickster’s functioning 
in relation to his sworn enemy: the system. 
 
 
2.2 From the System to Ragnarök 
 
To elaborate the trickster’s role in society, Bassil-Morozow evokes the notion of the 
system. The system indicates a “rule-making, power-containing, controlling construct of 
any size” that opposes free, uninhibited creative expression that comes from the 
individual’s part (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 8). The system is the conglomeration of 
sacrosanct borders to which the trickster is so detrimental, that is, language, religion, 
and culture (see Hynes 1997: 34). The system stifles the individual, it keeps on 
producing new forms of power that, in turn create new crevices for the trickster to 
wreak havoc. In other words, despite the trickster’s irrationality, he usually emerges in 
concrete social situations where an aspect of the system has become too constrictive. 
For instance, though Incandenza’s creation of the film ‘Infinite Jest’ seems like an 
accident that makes him commit suicide, it is a perfect materialization of the underlying 
desires of the novel’s characters. The trickster is, in other words, always tied to the 
system around him. As Bassil-Morozow (2015: 31) states, “[a] healthy system has an 
in-built trickster as a necessary chaotic element, [...] ensuring the system’s renewal 
within a controlled framework.” The system needs the trickster to cast away old 
structures and to regenerate new ones. It is tempting to have complete faith in the 
trickster’s progressive powers, but we need structure and constancy in our lives because 
our minds are not equipped to survive an unframed trickster: we would otherwise 
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experience the world as pure mayhem and uncontrolled change (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 
88). This is precisely the problem I find represented in Infinite Jest, in which the 
trickster has become overpowering. 
 
In contemporary society, the relationship between the trickster and the system has 
become problematic, and there is no guarantee of symmetry and harmony between the 
two. As “the local, narrow and stabilising character of culture gradually begins to 
change,” argues Bassil-Morozow (2015: 71), the system is no longer capable of 
completely framing the trickster. There is, therefore, a crack in the system that enables 
the ambiguous figure to seep into the culture’s structuring fabric without much 
resistance. What, then, are the consequences of the system’s failure to keep the trickster 
in check? Bassil-Morozow (2015: 82–83) maintains that once “the stabilising influence 
of the social milieu [is] no longer available, human beings start to look for alternative 
forms of self-identification – and for alternative and effective ways of stabilising the 
[...] trickster,” who relentlessly taunts us by presenting the possibility for an endless 
array of “unrealised opportunities and unlived lives and lifestyles.” The trickster proves 
to be a major challenge for the human psyche when the system cannot frame it. As a 
result, different forms of therapy and the self-help genre thrive: the human psyche needs 
a system to protect itself from the trickster’s overpowering, fragmenting effects, in 
whatever form possible (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 85, 92). The trickster’s overpowering 
effects disorientate and cause anxiety, and we need whatever substitutes for the system 
we can come up with to keep them at a safe distance. 
 
As a concluding remark of his study, Radin (1972: 168) states that every generation is 
bound to give new interpretations of the trickster. According to Bassil-Morozow’s ideas 
outlined above, the early 21st century is characterized by increasingly free, unframed 
outpourings of the trickster, which disturb and complicate our lives. She even calls this 
trickster-system relationship Ragnarök, the apocalyptic state where there are no gods to 
trust or show us the way (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 82). As I show, Wallace depicts a 
society where the trickster has become overwhelming, and Incandenza’s lethal film is a 
powerful symbol for its detrimental effects. This is evident in that practically all 
characters in Infinite Jest resort to some form of pathological behavior, whether it be the 
20 
 
obsessive ambition of tennis students, a harrowing addiction, or even being on a 
recovery program for addiction. All these behaviors are attempts to keep the trickster’s 
all-consuming powers at bay, and Incandenza’s ambiguous actions represent the roots 
of this outcome. 
 
 
2.3 Common Motifs in Trickster Narratives 
 
At some point in trickster narratives he tends to be trapped by some type of dominant 
force. It is common to find the trickster trapped in the beginning of the narrative, though 
this is not always the case (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 13; c.f. 2012: 24). Bassil-Morozow 
(2015: 13) argues that being trapped “is an allegory of control and order.” Imprisonment 
is, thus, a way to portray the system’s hold on the trickster. There are different ways in 
which being trapped is played out: mythological and folkloric tricksters tend to be 
restrained by someone with god-like powers to prevent apocalypse, as is the case with 
Loki, while the literary, non-mythological trickster is imprisoned on a more social level 
(Bassil-Morozow 2012: 25–26). However, the trickster’s ambiguity is present in this 
motif in that it is not a solely negative thing that the trickster is imprisoned, for 
imprisonment also stands for the proper balance between the trickster and the system 
that frames him (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 13). In Infinite Jest, we find addiction and 
ambition depicted as forms of imprisonment, which problematizes the trickster-system 
division. Furthermore, the novel also brings up the importance of structures as a 
necessary way to frame one’s life, to avoid the all-consuming power of the unframed 
trickster. But the novel is never clear when these attempts at structuring is a part of the 
cage itself, be it AA or rigorous tennis training. Imprisonment, I argue, is the novel’s 
central motif. 
 
Linked to the trickster’s inherent ability to cross boundaries is his gift of creativity. 
Bassil-Morozow (2012: 28) suggests that when the imprisoned trickster comes into 
contact with reality (that is, with reality structured by the system), an explosion of “mad 
creativity” ensues. The trickster’s creativity is not something planned but wild and 
random; it is an essential part of his playfulness (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 20). 
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Addressing the same issue, William J. Hynes (1997: 42) describes the trickster as a 
bricoleur, that is, as someone who mixes up all kinds of different materials at hand “in 
order to form a creative solution.” The trickster’s creativity consists of the ability to 
separate, but also to connect material that do not belong together. These modes of 
creativity are pronounced in my claim that James Incandenza is the trickster: his 
experimental filmmaking is a fitting example of a trickster’s creativity, most notably 
including the lethal ‘Infinite Jest’. 
 
Another recurring motif is that the trickster can transform his appearance in several 
cunning ways: he is a shapeshifter and often in disguise. The figure is characterized by 
his ability to transform physical appearance by changing clothes or even by 
reorganizing the malleable and fluid bodily matter he consists of (Hynes 1997: 36–37; 
Bassil-Morozow 2015: 19). Apart from bodily transformations, the trickster can readily 
adopt an identity that is not his own (Bassil-Morozow 2015: 19). But what does this 
element of transformation imply? Discussing bodily transformations as a literary motif, 
Mookerjee (2013: 6) argues that it problematizes the separation between base human 
impulses and what is socially demanded of us, thus striving to close the gap between the 
individual and the social by revealing the “primal and nakedly physical.” On a more 
general level, Bassil-Morozow (2015: 19) states that shapeshifting metaphorically 
depicts human identity and its relation to the forces that control it. It is, thus, the system 
that molds the primal physical matter into its socially acceptable form, and the trickster 
relentlessly resists being molded by traditions, customs, or, institutions, as we have 
already seen. In a crucial scene in Infinite Jest, Incandenza wears a mask in order to talk 
to his estranged son Hal, which implies that Incandenza resorts to trickster-like actions 
in an attempt to connect with him. 
 
We have now reached the last point of Bassil-Morozow’s outline for trickster stories: 
the trickster’s dissolution. The trickster being such a wild and chaotic character, it is 
necessary for him to die in the end because such chaos cannot be left roaming the world 
uncontrolled (Bassil-Morozow 2012: 38). Bassil-Morozow (2015: 23–24) stresses that 
“[a]fter the creative, chaotic unconscious energy has been woken up for the purpose of 
disrupting the stale (personal or social) order, it must go back to its dark wellspring,” 
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and that the trickster’s dissolution ultimately signifies the victory of the system to frame 
the chaotic energy it releases. The idea of the trickster’s dissolution is problematized in 
Wallace’s novel. Already its title, Infinite Jest, seems to denote a resistance to 
dissolving: the painful merriness the novel’s characters face is relentless, and the 
consequences are horrific if the trickster does not retreat to its secret dwelling place 
outside the system’s boundaries. The trickster’s effects are not diluted even after 
trickster-Incandenza dies, but are heightened by it: it is only after his death that the 
lethal film starts circulating ONAN. Wallace’s fictional universe is, essentially, a 
depiction of a trickster-infested Ragnarök where there are no gods offering guidance, 
only the trickster with its troubling and ambiguous presence.  
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3 THE TWO FATHERS AND THE TRICKSTER 
 
With focus on Lacanian theory, especially the works of cultural critic Slavoj Žižek, in 
this chapter I discuss overlaps between psychoanalysis and trickster theory. The crux of 
the above discussion is how Bassil-Morozow (2015: 71) problematizes the trickster-
system distinction by maintaining that in contemporary societies the system no longer 
frames the trickster in an effective way, making a whole variety of trickster experiences 
taunting us with their chaotic and disorienting presence. Due to this weakening distrust 
of “the system” to frame the trickster, people need to resort more and more to 
alternative sources for guidance and help at keeping the overpowering trickster at bay, 
In Infinite Jest, obsessive tennis training, addiction, and the process of addiction 
recovery and maintaining sobriety are all reactions to trickster’s overpowering grip. As I 
make clear in the following pages, the need to tame the overpowering trickster resonates 
strongly with Žižek’s investigations of psychic phenomena taunted by unnamable forces 
stemming from the superego. I begin this chapter by analyzing the trickster-system 
dichotomy with the basic Lacanian concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the 
Real, and enjoyment. I then move on to track Žižek’s separation of the two Fathers, 
namely, the prohibitive of law and the superego, law’s obscene underside. I then present 
Žižek’s (1999: 451) analysis of the “disintegration of paternal authority,” which implies 
a psychological condition much like Bassil-Morozow’s trickster-infested Ragnarök, 
only in this case it is the superego whose force is intensified. I conclude this chapter by 
discussing the concept of the death drive, which gives more insight into how the 
trickster-father’s effects functions in what I recognize as the depiction of Ragnarök in 
Infinite Jest.  
 
 
3.1 The Imaginary, the Symbolic, the Real, and Enjoyment 
 
One is usually introduced to psychoanalytic theory through the three orders that 
structure the psyche, and first one of these is called the Imaginary. The Imaginary is 
characterized as the state when the child is in a dyadic, symbiotic, even somehow 
incestuous relationship with the Mother (Lacan 1997 [1981]: 96). It is defined by 
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wholeness, similarity, and autonomy and the deception related to surface appearances; 
the imaginary is what enables us to conceive of ourselves as entities separate from each 
other, giving us our sense of self through what is called the mirror stage (Evans 1996: 
84). Occurring during early childhood, the mirror stage denotes the time in a child’s 
development when she recognizes her own image in the mirror. The moment of seeing 
one’s reflection establishes the ego in that the child identifies with the image and is 
convinced that she essentially is that reflection. Thus, the ego is strictly speaking not the 
product of recognition but of misrecognition. (Lacan 2006 [1966]: 75–81.) What this 
entails is that the ego is the site of “radical alienation” because one can never fully 
identify with the specular image that gives rise to the ego, the allure of its potential is 
always more appealing than what it really is (Homer 2005: 25). The ego is not a fixed 
entity but an accumulation of impressions and images; its most vital task is to give us 
the illusion of mastery, of being the one who controls our choices and actions. Despite 
these emphases on illusion and delusion, the ego is a vital part of our psyche as it 
creates the space for our sense of self. I use the concept of the Imaginary to approach 
the effects of obsessive ambition in Infinite Jest. As I show in the next chapter, what 
connects the novel’s depiction of ambition to the Lacanian Imaginary is that Hal’s and 
Orin’s attachment to an idealization of the ego is portrayed through the motif of mirror 
images. Furthermore, the concept has its implications in relation to the superego and, 
therefore, the trickster-father. I elaborate on this connection below. 
 
The Symbolic order is characterized by language, which deepens our sense of 
alienation. It is defined as that which is entered when a child starts to speak, thus 
becoming chained to language; and it is language, with its rules, structures and signs, 
that constitutes the Symbolic order and enables the exchange of meaning in society 
(Kurki 2004: 30; Fink 1995: 25). Žižek (1999: 377) explains that the Symbolic order, is 
“the anonymous circuitry which mediates any intersubjective communication and 
induces an irreducible ‘alienation’ as the price for entering its circuit.” Psychoanalytic 
theory sees the root of this alienation in language, as portrayed by the expressions 
‘mother tongue’ and ‘native language’; one is born into a world with its own rules and 
predating structures of meaning (Fink 1995: 7; Dean 2006: 5). Being a work of fiction, 
language plays a crucial role in Infinite Jest. Language is relevant for the present study 
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since the characters of the novel use language as a way to define and pinpoint the 
psychological effects of the trickster-father. The use of language is depicted in the novel 
as insufficient yet inescapable, an alienating prison but simultaneously the only medium 
one can use to navigate through Ragnarök, the apocalyptic cultural landscape without 
gods to trust. In Infinite Jest, the most striking example of language use is in the way it 
functions in Alcoholics Anonymous, in which the repetition of clichéd slogans plays a 
crucial role in keeping addiction at bay.  
 
Beside its linguistic foundation, the Symbolic order includes what is referred to as law. 
This implies that the regulations created by language are extended into the rituals, 
customs, and public institutions that structure our experience of the world (Dean 2006: 
136). In this sense, law corresponds in an overt manner with the concept of the system, 
the trickster’s sworn enemy. The purpose of both the system and the law is to maintain 
structures and give borders and cancel out elements that do not belong within its frame. 
What needs to be stressed at is that law is not complete, it “cannot be understood as a 
finite totality” because it “changes, adapts, unfolds, and expands in ways that cannot be 
fully systematized. Any such systematization will produce a remainder” that cannot be 
included in the Symbolic order (Dean 2006: 136). This remainder is what creates the 
root for law’s inherent instability. The trickster stands for that which exists outside the 
system, or at least is detrimental to it, while in psychoanalytic theory the remainder that 
always eludes the structures of language and law is called the Real. 
 
The Real is a highly problematic concept to define because it cannot, by definition, be 
expressed linguistically. Žižek (2008 [1989]: 190) defines the Real as  
 
simultaneously both the hard, impenetrable kernel resisting symbolization and a 
pure chimerical entity which has in itself no ontological consistency. [...] 
something that persists only as failed, missed, in a shadow, and dissolves itself as 
soon as we try to grasp it in its positive nature.  
 
We cannot talk about the Real because it exists independent of language and law. This 
resistance to definition is shared by the trickster, whom, as discussed above, cannot be 
defined due to his inherent hostility towards the borders of conceptualization. This 
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entails that the Real, like the trickster, is always something the Symbolic order cannot 
normalize or integrate into its body of rules. Žižek (2008 [1989]: 191) continues that the 
Real both precedes the Symbolic order but is also the outcome of its inability to 
integrate the Real into its network of signs and rules. The Real is, in other words, 
simultaneously that which exists outside the Symbolic but also the remainder of what 
cannot be Symbolized. One of the ways in which the Real effects our lives is through 
the concept of enjoyment, which, as I show below, is one of the trickster-father’s 
defining characteristics. 
 
In psychoanalytic theory, enjoyment stems from the lost Imaginary symbiosis with the 
Mother. The infant exists as oneness with the Mother, and cannot tell the two apart: “her 
breast, her body, are the infants own,” and this unified state is bliss (Dean 2006: 4). 
Lacan (2006 [1966]: 696) himself states that enjoyment “is prohibited to whoever 
speaks,” which makes the Symbolic order of language that which prohibits enjoyment. 
The impossibility of enjoyment is created by the Oedipus complex, during which 
incestuous impulses directed at the Mother are rejected, which, in turn, guarantees the 
spot in the Symbolic order as a speaking being (Lacan 1997 [1981]: 96; Evans 1996: 
94; Dean 2006: 4–5). Nonetheless, as Evans (1996: 94) continues, the ultimate function 
of the Symbolic order is to “sustain the [...] illusion that enjoyment would be attainable 
if it were not forbidden [by law]. The very prohibition creates the desire to transgress it, 
[making enjoyment] fundamentally transgressive.” Enjoyment is, therefore, impossible 
because it stems from the Real: it is assumed to be possible only in the pre-symbolic 
stage, beyond the child’s introduction into the Symbolic order of language and law. But 
what is enjoyment? Can it be defined if it is Real in the sense that it resists 
Symbolization? One way to explain this concept is to contrast it to its Symbolic double, 
namely, pleasure. 
 
It is crucial to make the theoretical distinction between pleasure and enjoyment, which 
have specific meanings in Lacanian theory, as I briefly mentioned in the opening 
chapter. This distinction further clarifies the relationship between the Symbolic and the 
Real from a socio-cultural point of view. Pleasure is delimited and controlled by law, 
which keeps it at a level that can be dealt with by the human psyche (Lacan 2004 
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[1973]: 31; Evans 1996: 150). We sense pleasure when we, for instance, eat tasty food 
or go for a stroll in the woods. Pleasure is very different from enjoyment, which has a 
very specific meaning in psychoanalysis. Enjoyment, Žižek (2006: 79) stresses, is not 
about pleasure but a “violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure.” Lacan 
(1992: 228) defines enjoyment as the suffering that is imposed upon us from beyond 
pleasure, the main function of which it is to keep us separated from enjoyment. It is an 
excessive, agonizing sense of pleasure that ultimately makes our lives worth living 
(Dean 2006: 4); although Kurki (2004: 85) encapsulates the concept as not fun to 
experience. There emerges a pattern in this opposition between pleasure and enjoyment: 
pleasure is Symbolic, regulated by law, while enjoyment corresponds with the 
unnamable Real. In Infinite Jest, enjoyment persists as the driving force behind 
ambition and addiction. I see the idea that enjoyment is painful and pleasurable at the 
same time as creating the psychic motivation for the pathological behaviors depicted in 
the novel’s characters. This helps to conceptualize behavior that might seem detrimental 
but actually produces so much excessive pleasure that the novel’s characters cannot stop 
doing it. 
 
To conclude this subsection, I argue that the trickster-system dichotomy corresponds to 
the psychoanalytic concepts of the Real and the Symbolic. On the one hand, the 
Symbolic order is precisely the conglomeration of rules and institutions that define the 
system, they create different ways to control our access to enjoyment. What Lacanian 
theory highlights more than Bassil-Morozow in her trickster theory is the linguistic 
basis of the Symbolic order. On the other hand, the Real’s resistance to symbolization 
comes very close to the trickster’s a-structurality. The trickster can be defined, like the 
Real, as the “chimerical entity”, to refer to Žižek’s (2008 [1989]: 190) formulation, that 
resists definition and normalization, always slipping through our fingers the moment we 
think we have him in our grip. Psychoanalytically speaking, the trickster’s objective is 
to expose the Symbolic order to instances of the Real: the Winnebago trickster defames 
the tribe’s war and marriage rituals, thus poking holes into the Symbolic. Loki’s 
murdering Baldr threatens to erase the whole Symbolic order maintained by the gods, 
making Ragnarök a violent outburst of the Real. By keeping these conceptualizations 
and connections in mind, I now move on to Žižek’s interpretation of the two Fathers, 
28 
 
which complicates the Symbolic-Real opposition and gives me the tools needed to 
analyze Ragnarök from a psychoanalytic perspective. The crucial question to be 
answered in the next section is how to situate the trickster in relation to the Lacanian 
notion of enjoyment. 
 
 
3.2 The Two Fathers and Ragnarök 
 
In Žižek’s theory, the basis for the two Fathers can be found in Freud’s Totem and 
Taboo (1913), in which he delves deep into the mythic past to speculate on the origins 
of culture and humanity. Conversely to the Oedipal narrative, in the myth of the 
primordial father, it is the act of killing the father that gives rise to the prohibitions, only 
from beyond the grave (Žižek 1999: 379). In this narrative, Freud focuses on Darwin’s 
study of a pre-societal community, which he calls the ‘primal horde’, where the father is 
a jealous, violent figure who appropriates all the women of the tribe and expels his 
maturing sons, whom he sees as his rivals. What follows is that the expelled sons unite 
and plan to slay their father, thus putting an end to his cruel tyranny and freeing the 
women whom he has come to possess. But after they have committed the planned 
murder, the brothers start feeling guilty for what they did. This guilt functions as the 
impulse to reinstate the dead father’s prohibitions: they, in a way, “undid their deed” by 
commanding that one is not to kill one’s father. Nor did they enjoy the women they 
fought to liberate, but refrained from them. In short, the sons’ guilt erected the Oedipal 
prohibitions of parricide and incest. (Freud 1966 [1913]: 915–917.)  
 
The first father that emerges from this narrative is the dead one, the Symbolic 
prohibition erected by the guilt-ridden sons in their father’s name. This is why, in 
Lacanian theory, one refers to the Name of the Father, in which the ‘name’ connotes the 
Symbolic status of the father, while in French the homonymous ‘non’ (Nom/Non du 
Père) connotes prohibition: it is simultaneously the Name/No of the Father (Fink 1995: 
57, 147; Kurki 2004: 86). In other words, the Name of the Father guarantees a neutrality 
in relation to law and thus forms the structural basis in creating our Symbolically 
structured existence (Žižek 2008 [1992]: 178; Fink 1995: 55). Žižek (2008 [1992]: 
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216n18; see also 1999: 377–378) clarifies that the Father5 is “the ‘repressive’ agency of 
prohibition.” The idea that the Symbolic and the Real can never meet renders the 
Father’s function to instill the authority of the Symbolic order, which is to say, to 
prohibit access to enjoyment (Žižek 1999: 388). The Symbolic Father is, therefore, that 
which represses. He is the agency that maintains the constricting and constructing 
effects of the law/system that keep us in check. On the other hand, Žižek’s use of 
quotation marks indicates that the repressiveness of the Father might not be as simple as 
it seems. 
 
What is crucial to the concept of the Father as it is portrayed in Freud’s myth, is that his 
authority is elevated at the wake of the primordial father. This underlies the inherent 
impossibility of enjoyment: the Father’s symbolic authority is elevated at the moment 
the sons free themselves from the primordial father’s tyrannical rule (Žižek 1999: 379; 
Evans 1996: 132–133). This indicates that eliminating the obstacle that prohibits 
enjoyment, namely the violent primordial father, leads to a subsequent reassertion of the 
same prohibitions, even in a stricter form. Thus, the murdered father “became stronger 
than the living [one] had been” (Freud 1966 [1913]: 917). This insight is important for 
the present study in that it shows parricide, or in Infinite Jest Incandenza’s suicide, as 
not something to be read straightforwardly as an event that liberates a set of characters 
from the control of a tyrannical authority figure. In chapter 4, I use this interpretation of 
the dead father as the basis to analyze the psychological effects Incandenza’s suicide 
has on the other characters in the novel. Furthermore, I argue in the next chapter that 
Incandenza’s suicide signifies the psychic backdrop from which the trickster-father 
emerges.  
 
This brings us, then, to the second father to be found in the mythic narrative 
paraphrased above, the primordial father before his death, which is connected to the 
Lacanian interpretation of the concept known as the superego. As opposed to the 
Symbolic Father, the primordial father is to be located on the side of the Real and 
enjoyment (Žižek 2006: 80); the superego is the violent, ferocious father who possessed 
                                                 
5 To minimize cumbersome sentences, I henceforth refer to the Symbolic, prohibitive function of the 
Name of the Father with the capitalized word ‘Father’. 
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all the women of the primal horde, thus excluding the sons from his monopoly of 
enjoyment. Hence, it is enjoyment that defines the superego. Lacan (1998: 3) himself 
defines the superego as follows: “Nothing forces anyone to enjoy except the superego. 
The superego is the imperative of jouissance [enjoyment] – Enjoy!” Žižek (2008 
[1991]: 9) defines the superego as the call to enjoy: “enjoyment itself, which we 
experience as transgression, is in its innermost status something imposed, ordered – 
when we enjoy, we never do it ‘spontaneously’, we always follow a certain injunction.” 
Dean (2006: 30) emphasizes that the Lacanian interpretation of the superego is 
counterintuitive because it sees the superego as a command to enjoy “against the 
prohibitions of symbolic norms.” Žižek (1999: 319) elaborates that the superego 
manipulates what has to be given up in order to enter the Symbolic order, thus 
indicating the pre-symbolic possibility of enjoyment, which is prohibited by law.  The 
superego’s injunction to enjoy thus urges us to transgress the prohibitions of the Father 
and the Symbolic order. Finally, what encapsulates the superego is its insatiability: the 
superego addresses us “with impossible demands and then mocks [our] botched 
attempts to meet them,” making us guiltier the more we conform to its demands (Žižek 
2006: 80). It is this insatiability that forever chains us to the superego, whose obscene 
injunctions we can never satisfy. 
 
What, then, are the effects of the superego’s injunction to enjoy? How can its effects be 
detected in our lives? Žižek (1999: 450; 2008 [1992]: 216n18) insists that when 
enjoyment becomes our duty, our ability to experience enjoyment is hindered more 
effectively than a strict prohibition that nonetheless maintains the space for 
transgressing it. Dean (2006: 32) summarizes the psychological consequences of 
enjoyment becoming a duty in an illustrative and perceptive way:  
 
When enjoyment is a duty, we want to escape from it, so the order to enjoy 
actually hinders our enjoyment. We might think here of the way the pressure to 
enjoy ourselves while on vacation can be exhausting. By the time we return home, 
we are relieved to back at work so we are no longer compelled to keep having fun. 
[...] Once we are in the situation where we are expected to have a good 
conversation, where we feel that it is our duty to be smart or interesting, we find 
ourselves at a loss for words. 
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The sense we have that something that is supposed to be fun is rendered painful and 
disturbing by the superego. Our ability to experience enjoyment is challenged because 
we can never fully satisfy the superego’s obscene injunction, or in other words, we can 
never enjoy enough.   
 
There is, thus, a clear contrast between the prohibition of the Symbolic Father and the 
superego’s injunction to enjoy, which is effectively illustrated by Žižek (1999: 320) 
with an ironic, banal example of a father telling his child that she is to come and visit 
her grandmother. In this scene, the Symbolic Father confronts his child with a clear 
command: “You are coming to visit your grandmother whether you like it or not!”; on 
the other hand, the superego commands his child as follows: “You do know how much 
grandma loves you, but you should only come along if you really want to” (Žižek 1999: 
320). What we have is a clear command juxtaposed with a choice that speaks directly to 
our innermost feelings. The catch is that the choice of the latter example is an illusory 
one, Žižek (1999: 320) insists, because the child knows that she has to go visit her 
grandma, but the superego command includes that the child has to enjoy the visit, she 
has to have fun visiting her grandmother. As my analysis shows, Incandenza is depicted 
as a father who imposes the command to enjoy to the characters of the novel. As I show 
in the next chapter, some of the disturbing pathologies suffered by the novel’s 
characters can be read back to Incandenza functioning as the figure who brought them 
about. The main challenge the characters in Infinite Jest face is, fundamentally, to find 
ways to negotiate the superego’s fierce injunction.  
 
I conjecture that the trickster-father is essentially the superego, whose actions reflect 
those attributable to the trickster. The superego and the trickster are close to one another 
in that they emerge from the Real, from that which by definition cannot be expressed 
linguistically. Moreover, both the trickster and the superego are highly detrimental to 
the Symbolic system, the other one unraveling systemic control, while the other 
encourages transgression, that is, behavior that can be found in trickster narratives. In 
this study, Incandenza is identified as a trickster because he resorts to, for instance, 
disguise and mad creativity in order to achieve his mischief. Moreover, what 
accentuates Incandenza as the trickster is that he is not even aware of his deeds, making 
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the underlying motivations of his actions even more ambiguous. What the term 
trickster-father indicates is that a trickster-like agency has merged with the notion of 
superego, issuing superego commands to enjoy with the chaotic, a-structural wildness 
of a trickster. This is, essentially the cultural condition I find depicted in Wallace’s 
novel.  
 
What is to be further emphasized about the superego’s insatiable injunction is that it is 
essentially inseparable from law, and that this inseparability transforms the notion of 
law’s repressiveness. Žižek (2005: 54) elaborates that the superego emerges from the 
gaps and failures inherent in Symbolic itself: “Superego is the obscene ‘nightly’ law 
that necessarily redoubles and accompanies” the Symbolic order and law. What the law 
being split into the Symbolic and superego sides entails is that  
 
[i]n contrast to the [...] notion of a Law checking, canalizing, alienating, 
oppressing, ‘Oedipianizing’ some previous ‘flux of desire’, Law is here conceived 
as an agency of ‘disalienation’ and ‘liberation’: it opens our access to desire by 
enabling us to disengage ourselves from the rule of the Other’s whim. (Žižek 
2008 [1991]: 265) 
 
In this passage, Žižek reveals that law, the Symbolic authority of the Father, can in fact 
be liberating: it frees us from the uncontrollable whim of the Other, which is to say, 
from the superego. To explain Žižek, Dean (2006: 145) evokes Totem and Taboo and 
points out that once the sons kill “the [primordial] father, they are no longer subject to 
his violent, obscene, monopoly of enjoyment.” Law is, in other words, not solely an 
agency that keeps us in check, but it also helps to keep the superego from completely 
consuming us. Law’s potential to free us from the superego’s impossible demands 
reverses the notion that our inner moral sensibilities are more reliable than external 
“repressive” law (Žižek 2008 [1991]:  240–241; Dean 2006: 148). Nonetheless, this 
duality creates a cycle in which the Symbolic law needs the superego in order to keep 
reproducing and reformulating itself, which in turn transforms the superego, and so on 
(Dean 2006: 159). It is an endless loop. 
 
33 
 
Thus far I have delved into the opposition between the Symbolic and the Real as it is 
presented in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. I introduced the concept of enjoyment, 
which exists in the Real and needs to be controlled by Symbolic means because the 
human psyche is not equipped to deal with it. The duality of the Symbolic and the Real 
was also found to correspond with the two fathers, the Symbolic Father who enforces 
law, and the superego who commands to transgress that law, and derive enjoyment from 
it. These two entities were found to be linked, in that the more we obey the superego’s 
command, the more ways law will produce to regulate them. I also pointed out that law 
can potentially liberate us from the superego’s irrational and impossible demands. But 
Žižek takes the duality of these concepts to a direction that comes close to Bassil-
Morozow’s (2015) interpretation of the present state of things as a trickster-infested 
Ragnarök, during which all the gods have been dethroned, leaving the trickster’s chaotic 
presence controlling the cultural landscape (see chapter 2 above). The psychoanalytic 
Ragnarök concentrates on the effects of what Žižek (1999: 451) calls “the disintegration 
of paternal authority,” which leads to a transformation of how our lives are structured 
by the Symbolic on the one hand, and how we relate to the superego command to enjoy 
on the other. I will now move on to present Žižek’s interpretation of Ragnarök.  
 
The “disintegration of paternal authority” refers to the idea that the Symbolic order, and 
everything it stands for, its rules, regulations, and role as an intersubjective mediator, 
has become compromised and lost its structuring effect. As Žižek (1999: 388) states, it 
is “the father of the uncompromising ‘No!’, who is effectively in retreat,” which creates 
new possible ways for the relationship between the Symbolic and the Real of enjoyment 
to structure our lives. I see this claim that the prohibitive Father is no longer in effect as 
Žižek’s way to conceptualize the end of grand narratives from a psychoanalytic point of 
view. In other words, our lives are no longer defined by entities such as Tradition or 
Nature (Žižek 1999: 440), meaning that the unquestionable power of institutions such 
as, say, Religion or the State no longer impose their structures upon us as effectively as 
before. The consequence of this collapse is that the Father’s Symbolic authority gives 
rise to an increasingly ferocious superego, leaving us to the mercy of the sadistic and 
obscene “superego injunction to enjoy” (Žižek 1999: 451). In another context, Žižek 
(2008 [1992]: 181) goes so far as stating that “[t]he allegedly archaic figure of the 
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‘primordial father’ is actually a thoroughly modern entity, a result of the decline of the 
[Symbolic Father]”. Our social condition is, in other words, characterized by an 
intensification of the superego’s injunction, making the primordial father an emblem of 
our times. And, as my study aims to show, the trickster-father I find depicted in Infinite 
Jest is a development of the superego’s intensification. 
 
What the waning of the Father’s Symbolic authority entails is that we need to find 
substitutes for law (Žižek 1999: 417–418), or, to put it differently, we need to find 
alternative ways for keeping the overpowering pressure of the superego from 
completely crushing us under its command to enjoy. Sarah Kay (2003: 140) elaborates 
Žižek’s argument by stating that once the Father’s prohibition is no longer in effect, our 
only option is “to turn to gurus, do-it-yourself books, agony aunts, professional 
shoppers, quangos and a plethora of other miniaturized substitutes.” This resonates with 
Bassil-Morozow’s (2015: 82, 86) view of Ragnarök, the state where there are no gods to 
trust and no tradition to rely on, where the “individual drowns in the sea of fragmenting 
trickster experiences [...], relying mostly on himself [sic] to structure these tasks and 
experiences.” In Infinite Jest, the trickster-father’s effects can be detected in its 
portrayal of the addiction recovery process. As I show in chapter 4, the novel depicts 
this process through Don Gately, who resorts to AA and the addiction recovery 
community as a substitute for the structuring effects of law. Hence, Gately’s sobriety 
functions as a way to silence the trickster-father’s command to step outside the borders 
the recovery process creates and enjoy drugs again. 
 
Finally, the waning of the Symbolic Father reintroduces the Imaginary order into the 
forefront of our psychic lives. As I explained in the beginning of this chapter, the 
Imaginary stands for the creation of the ego as a misrecognized specular image. What 
the waning of the Father’s Symbolic authority entails is that the superego’s commands 
are increasingly located in the Imaginary order, in the ideal ego we can never fully 
reach; this phenomenon is called the “superegoization of the imaginary ideal” (Žižek 
1999: 451). This idea ultimately stems from the relationship between the three Lacanian 
orders: when the Symbolic order weakens and loses its effect, the Imaginary and the 
Real overlap (Žižek 1999: 459), and the primary manifestation of this is that the 
35 
 
superego emerges as a figure who imposes the Imaginary ideal. Kay (2003: 140) 
explains that “[i]nstead of having a symbolic function that provides us with a point of 
identification in the symbolic[...], we proliferate symbolic authorities that are jumped-
up versions of our ideal ego, and hence a sign of narcissistic regression.” In relation to 
trickster theory, Bassil-Morozow (2015: 82–83) has a similar idea in mind when she 
states that the trickster is pulling the strings in the fluidization of identity, presenting us 
with a chaotic array of lifestyle choices and unexplored experiences. Žižek (1999: 451) 
concludes “that this [...] self-enclosure leaves [us] to the (not so) tender mercies of the 
superego injunction to enjoy,” and the same can be said about the trickster-father. I see 
Incandenza the trickster-father as standing for this overlap between the superego and the 
Imaginary ideal. As I show in the next chapter, Hal and Ortho have are so committed to 
their ideal egos, the unattainable specular images of themselves as successful, popular, 
and great tennis players, leads to horrific consequences.  
 
 
3.4 Desire and the Death Drive 
 
I have now reached my elaboration of how the Symbolic-Real opposition works in the 
concepts of desire and the death drive. In order to shed light to how enjoyment 
functions in this context, I refer to the drive’s oppositional pair: desire. Desire is 
produced by the Symbolic law that prohibits enjoyment; it is always aimed at acquiring 
substitutes for the maternal object one loses after entering the Symbolic order, though 
nothing can never fill its place, nothing is ever “it” (Žižek 1999: 351). Desire is, in other 
words, produced by prohibition and sustained by an endless, exhausting search for 
recovering the loss this prohibition introduces. Here the object of enjoyment is 
unattainable (Žižek 1999: 351). Desire is, therefore, kept in motion by this never-ending 
search. The drive stands for the opposite of desire, in which enjoyment is not derived 
through the illusory promise of an unattainable object, but through the continuous 
failures of arriving at this object: drive is another name for the notion that we can never 
fully rid ourselves of enjoyment (Žižek 1999: 351–352, 354). Kay (2003: 106) states 
that desire is Symbolic because it is regulated by law, and conversely the drive is the 
closest the human psyche gets to the Real. Here we find the two concepts again 
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represented as if opposites, though they are nonetheless linked, which is the case with 
the Father and the superego as well. I now turn to a closer examination of the concept 
known as the death drive. 
 
The death drive pushes the logic of the drive to its extreme. Žižek (2009: 62) 
emphasizes that the concept of the death drive is not to be taken as a  
 
thrust toward destruction or self-obliteration: the [...] death drive has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the craving for self-annihilation, for the return to the 
inorganic absence of any life-tension; it is, on the contrary, the very opposite of 
dying—a name for the “undead” eternal life itself, for the horrible fate of being 
caught in the endless repetitive cycle of wandering around in guilt and pain. 
 
This dense passage turns the Freudian death drive on its head. The death drive is no 
longer the instinctual yearning to an inanimate state, the Thanatos as Freud (2001) 
envisioned in his essay “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.” Žižek defines the death drive 
as not a destructive will to return to an inanimate state, but as an excess of life, a 
concept with disturbing implications of being caught in repeating the same actions and 
behaviors, over and over again. Žižek (1999: 355) continues that “the death drive is not 
the mark of human finitude, but its very opposite, the name for ‘eternal (spectral) life’, 
the index of a dimension in human existence that persists for ever, beyond physical 
death [...].” This “eternal life” is, essentially, the idea I discussed above our inability to 
fully rid ourselves of enjoyment: we are condemned to it; and as the death drive 
produces enjoyment, it is linked to the superego, whose commands help to sustain this 
excess of enjoyment through our repetitive failures of living up to them (Žižek 1999: 
354, 481). As I show in the next chapter, Infinite Jest evokes the death drive in that it 
portrays not the anxiety of its characters’ approaching deaths but the very idea that the 
trickster-father fills their lives with so much enjoyment that it seems infinite, the eternal 
life of the death drive. 
 
I deploy the death drive because Infinite Jest is filled with pathological repetitions. The 
clearest instance of the logic of the death drive is to be found in ‘Infinite Jest’, 
Incandenza’s film that is so entertaining that anyone who watches it is bound to repeat 
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the viewing, until death. The novel presents the death drive as more prominent than 
desire, which is already clear in how the lethal film functions: even the film cannot give 
the novel’s characters the lost object in that they need to repeat the viewing. But this 
similar structure of repeating is found in other forms as well: ambitious tennis training 
at ETA is depicted as obsessively repetitive; the addiction recovery program featured in 
the novel relies on a series of repeated rituals from attending AA meetings to chores, 
mantras and linguistic clichés that are meant to redeem from the addiction. What 
Incandenza’s revelatory film is ultimately testament to is that its structure is ubiquitous 
in Wallace’s fictional universe; all activities function according to the same repetitive 
logic. Even the novel’s name can be seen as implying the horrifying eternity of being 
caught in a cycle of repetition, of deriving an infinite amount of enjoyment. What I try 
to find out in the next chapter is how the novel presents its characters as stuck in a loop 
maintained by the trickster-father’s commands. As I argue in the next chapter, the death 
drive is placed at the center of how I see Ragnarök depicted in Infinite Jest: this 
terrifying eternity is a crucial manifestation of the trickster-father’s prison. 
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4 THE TRICKSTER-FATHER IN INFINITE JEST 
 
I have now shown how Bassil-Morozow’s trickster theory and Žižek’s development of 
Lacanian ideas explain a similar social condition: the psychological consequences of the 
socio-cultural system’s failure to frame and shape our experience of the world. Bassil-
Morozow (2015: 82) insists that the collapse of systemic structures frees the trickster to 
roam the world uninhibitedly, affecting our lives in more complex ways than ever 
before. Žižek (1999: 451) approaches this issue by building upon the theoretical 
implications of the failure of the Symbolic Father as the enforcer of law, which 
intensifies its obscene counterpart, namely, the superego who commands us to enjoy 
and transgress the law. Žižek and Bassil-Morozow seem to share the idea about the 
consequences of the system’s demise: it leads to a need to find alternative ways to frame 
our lives, to give structure that keeps, respectively, the trickster and the superego from 
completely overpowering our experience of the world. In other words, both theorists see 
our lives at the mercy of uncontrollable, ambiguous forces that threaten to consume us. 
The objective of this chapter is to use psychoanalytic theory to analyze the ways in 
which Incandenza suggests the merging together of the trickster and the superego into 
the agency I call the trickster-father. Furthermore, I also look at how the trickster-father 
features as a force that looms behind the pathological behavior and psychological ill 
depicted in the characters of the novel, most crucially in Hal Incandenza and Don 
Gately.  
 
 
4.1 Incandenza as the Trickster-Father 
 
In this section I focus on how Incandenza symbolizes what I call the trickster-father. 
What its name implies is that the trickster merges with the role of the superego as it is 
used in psychoanalytic theory. As I elaborate in the following pages, the trickster-father 
emerges when the Father’s Symbolic authority becomes compromised. The trickster-
father is, therefore, a superego figure who issues the command to enjoy and encourages 
transgression, but does so according to the logic of a trickster. Differently put, the 
trickster-father is a trickster who has crept on the underside of law itself, occupying the 
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position of the superego as the obscene underbelly upon which law is built. I begin this 
section by looking at how the failure of the Father’s authority is depicted in the 
character of James Incandenza.   
 
 
4.1.1 The Disintegration of Symbolic Authority 
 
Incandenza signifies the Father’s Symbolic authority in a passage in which he confronts 
his eldest son, Orin, after having found out that he has been watching a pornographic 
film (IJ 955–956). Incandenza regulates Orin’s behavior, which implies the Symbolic 
Father as marking the limits of transgression. Narrated in the first-person by Hal, it 
takes place at the time his father was the headmaster at ETA, several years before the 
novel’s narrative present. It is set in the headmaster’s office, where Incandenza sits 
behind his desk, connoting respectability, authority, and power. After Hal’s brother 
confesses watching the film, their father reacts in the following way: 
 
he wasn’t going to forbid them to watch the thing if they really wanted to. But just 
please keep it discreet [...] nobody younger, and nobody whose parents might hear 
about it, and for God’s sake don’t let your mother get wind. But that Orin was old 
enough to make his own entertainment-decisions, and if he decided he wanted to 
watch the thing....And so on. (IJ 955) 
 
What connects Incandenza to the Symbolic Father is his giving boundaries to Orin, 
giving him the limits within which his act is socially acceptable, even if it is not totally 
agreeable. Whatever concerns Orin might have had as to the consequences of his 
transgression are neutralized by the authority of the Father. In this scene, Incandenza 
can be said to represent the Symbolic Father to the extent that he instills law by 
delimiting his son’s transgression, but also by acting as the Father who liberates from 
the superego’s pressure to enjoy.  
 
What introduces the failure of the Father in this scene is that Incandenza continues 
toward a more personal direction, ultimately leaving him ridiculed by Orin. 
Incandenza’s earnestness is foreshadowed when he is described as offering Orin a 
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lemon soda and rubbing his eyes in a “sad and ruminative” way (IJ 955), indicating that 
he does not want to make Orin feel uncomfortable and that he puts though into what he 
wants to say. The confrontation continues: 
 
But Himself said that if Orin wanted his personal, fatherly as opposed to 
headmasterly, take on it, then he [...] would rather Orin didn’t watch a hardporn 
film yet. He said this with such reticent earnestness there was no way Orin 
couldn’t ask him how come. Himself [...] finally said he was afraid of the film 
giving Orin the wrong idea about having sex (IJ 995–996). 
 
Incandenza explains that he does not like what his son has done because it might affect 
his views on what sex is, and implores that Orin waits until he truly loves someone 
before he even thinks about these matters (IJ 996). Hal reveals the failure of 
Incandenza’s speech by reminiscing that Orin found his father’s earnestness moving 
only because he thought that he was not yet sexually active (IJ 996). Orin’s sneer at 
Incandenza’s earnestness implies the lack of effect the Father’s prohibition has: The 
Father’s ‘No’ does not sink in, it is a failed attempt at instilling prohibition. What 
ultimately remains of the Father’s Symbolic status is the comically exaggerated image 
of him sitting behind an authoritative desk, nothing more.  
 
Incandenza stands for the Father’s waning authority in a passage where he confronts 
Hal as a masked ‘professional conversationalist’, a scene in which Incandenza is 
deprived of a medium inherent to the Father, namely, language. This scene is tied to the 
one analyzed above with Orin, in that Incandenza is again sitting authoritatively behind 
a desk, offering his younger son some lemon soda, as he did with his eldest son. What 
draws attention to the role of language in this conversation is that it is narrated only 
through dialog: there is no outside voice commenting on the exchange between the two 
characters. This also heightens the sense of claustrophobia that this passage evinces. 
After introducing himself, the disguised Incandenza asks whether his son knows the 
meaning for the word ‘implore’, to which Hal answers the word’s OED entry in 
verbatim, which is marveled at by Incandenza, who is in awe of his son’s lexical talents 
(IJ 28). Once Hal notices that the “conversationalist’s” “whole face is running” and 
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“nose pointing at [his] lap”, he realizes he is talking to his father (IJ 30). An agitated 
Hal then questions his father’s delusional belief that he never speaks, though to no avail:  
 
‘I can’t just sit here watching you think I’m mute while your fake nose points at 
the floor. And are you hearing me talking, Dad? It speaks. It [...] defines implore 
and converses with you.’ 
‘Praying for just one conversation, amateur or no, that does not end in terror? That 
does not end like all the others: you staring, me swallowing?’ 
‘...’ 
‘Son?’ 
‘...’ 
‘Son?’ (IJ 31, italics in original) 
 
These lines end this whole section. Incandenza’s desperate attempts to communicate 
with his son are responded to with mere silence. As Holland (2014: 84) notes, 
Incandenza’s inability to communicate with Hal denotes his inability to instill the 
Father’s law. What heightens the desperateness of Incandenza’s attempt to do so is his 
request for Hal to define ‘implore’: the scene presents the Father imploring to his son, 
praying for a connection through which he can instill Symbolic authority. But no matter 
how effectively Hal can define the word, the Father’s imploration remains a failure that 
ends in silence that further separates him from his son.    
 
The final way Incandenza stands for the disintegration of the Father is, quite obviously, 
his suicide. The implications of Incandenza’s death resonate strongly with Žižek’s 
interpretation of Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1966 [1913]). As I conclude above, the 
point of this mythic narrative is to show enjoyment as not only prohibited but 
impossible: the primordial father’s killing does not create uninhibited access to 
enjoyment, but needs to be regulated by the murderous sons (see p. 29 above). 
Therefore, this myth presents a moment when the primordial father’s violent authority is 
suspended, but also eventually substituted by the regulations created by the sons. To 
apply this matrix to Infinite Jest, I argue that Incandenza’s death symbolizes not the 
death of the obscene, primordial father, but the disintegration of the Father itself. 
Incandenza’s death stands for the failure of the Father’s power to structure the world 
around us, to give it fixed meaning and stable borders. To follow the logic of Žižek’s 
(2008 [1992]: 181; 1999: 451) idea that the intensification of the superego is an 
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outcome of the Father’s disintegration, Incandenza’s death signifies this very 
transformation: the disintegration of law resuscitates the cruel primordial father, that is, 
the obscene, insatiable superego who commands us to enjoy. I argue that this obscene 
command to enjoy is at work already in the scenes with Orin and Hal, who process their 
father’s attempts to connect as commands to enjoy.  
 
Incandenza suggests the failure of the Father’s Symbolic authority in that he is unable to 
speak with his son nor is he able to instill law: these failures eventually culminate in his 
death and intensify the superego. Incandenza represents the superego in the passages 
analyzed above since both Orin and Hal are affected by their respective talks with their 
father, which is detectable in the pathologies manifested in both characters. For Orin, a 
sex addict, the conversation with Incandenza concerning the porn film introduces 
enjoyment in a compulsive form: Incandenza’s attempt to prohibit the porn film, fearing 
it gives his son the wrong idea about sex and love, is processed by Orin as a command 
to enjoy. As the superego can never be fully satisfied, it leaves Orin always wanting 
more, caught in a recursive loop of enjoyment he cannot escape. To put it briefly, Hal is 
tied to the superego’s effects through his inability to speak in the chronological end of 
the narrative, in which we find him unable to address members of a university 
admissions board. Does this mean that Incandenza’s failure to communicate with his 
son creates a command to enjoy language, to withdraw between words themselves? Or 
is Hal’s silence his way to evade the superego’s insatiable command, a fear of failure 
taken so extreme the most viable option is to refrain from speech? I return to the 
implications of Hal and his inability to speak below.  
 
From the point of view of Bassil-Morozow’s trickster theory, Incandenza’s failures 
represent the system’s ability to instill power to frame the trickster. Incandenza’s 
failures denote the psychic background for the novel’s events: the system is no longer 
effective, its function as the regulator of the trickster’s chaotic a-structurality has 
become compromised. On the one hand, according to psychoanalytic theory, the 
diminishing of Symbolic regulation leads to an ever-stronger power for the superego to 
taunt its subjects, which we saw in the case of Orin’s sex addiction and Hal’s 
relationship with language. On the other hand, as I discuss above, in Bassil-Morozow’s 
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(2015: 82–83) trickster theory, the system’s failure leads to all kinds of tricksters being 
released to haunt the social order. This creates a link between the superego’s command 
to enjoy and the awakening of an overpowering trickster, a link I find depicted in 
Incandenza’s suicide. In other words, if Incandenza’s death signifies the disintegration 
of the Father and the intensification of the superego, as I argue above, his suicide also 
generates the trickster-father. But what makes the character a trickster? What are the 
actions this character performs that merits this term? I will now move on to analyzing 
the emergence of the trickster-father by referring to the common motifs and 
characteristics in trickster stories I discussed above. 
 
 
4.1.2 “His Last Resort: Entertainment” – The Emergence of the Trickster-Father 
 
Incandenza is wearing a mask in the scene with Hal, thus using disguise to forward his 
ambiguous agenda. Disguise is a common way for the trickster to accomplish his 
deceptions and tricks, which I show above in the case of Loki, who disguises himself as 
a woman in order to approach Baldr’s mother to find out his weakness and set in motion 
Ragnarök, the death of all the gods. Another form of disguise I discuss above is the 
Winnebago trickster posing as a tribal chief, violating the tribe’s sacred war rituals. 
Firstly, Incandenza suggests the trickster through this same kind of false posing. His 
being masked is the only way he can maintain a connection with his son, to 
communicate with him. But the disguise is a failure, and the conversation with Hal ends 
in silence as I show above. What this implies is that the trickster emerges when the 
Father’s Symbolic authority fails: Incandenza’s resorting to disguise brings the law’s 
underside to the forefront: it can be seen as depicting the Father’s attempt at instilling 
law at the wake of his Symbolic authority. Then, instead of being able to connect with 
his son, the Father emerges as an obscene figure with a poorly fitting mask that cannot 
hear his son speak. This passage shows that the motif of disguise portrays the failure of 
Symbolic authority and foreshadows the subsequent emergence of the trickster-father.  
 
What solidifies Incandenza’s transformation into the trickster-father is his mad 
creativity. Incandenza’s filmic career culminates in his creation of ‘Infinite Jest’, the 
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ambiguous, lethally entertaining film that gives the novel its title. With the film, he 
uncovers the very matter that should be kept repressed and blocked by the Symbolic 
Father. With the film, Incandenza has created a portal that transforms through law’s 
prohibition and into the realm of enjoyment, and the little the reader finds out about it 
indicates that the film portrays the unity with the Mother that must be rejected in order 
to be able to exist in the Symbolic order that is structured by law and prohibition (see 
pp. 24–26 above): we learn that the lead actress of ‘Infinite Jest’, Joelle Van Dyne, 
“wore an incredible white gown of some sort of flowing material and leaned in over the 
camera in the crib and apologized”; she continues that she was ordered to repeat “at 
least twenty minutes of permutations of ‘I’m sorry’ ” (IJ 939). This image can be read 
as the Mother apologizing for having to let the baby become separated and torn by the 
Father into the Symbolic order. What strengthens the film’s connection to 
psychoanalytic theory is that to shoot the film, Incandenza modifies his camera’s lens to 
make the image seem as if through a baby’s eyes:  
 
The camera was fitted with a lens with something Jim called I think an auto-
wobble [...] The crib-lens’s mount projected out way farther than a conventional 
lens, but it wasn’t nearly as big around as a catadioptric lens. It looked more like 
an eye-stalk or a night-vision scope than a lens. Long and skinny and projecting, 
with this light wobble. [...] Plus I think a milky blur. Neonatal Nystagmus. [...] I 
don’t think there’s much doubt the lens was supposed to reproduce an infantile 
visual field. That’s what you could feel was driving the scene. (IJ 939–940) 
 
Thus, ‘Infinite Jest’ condenses the underlying implications of the addiction-riddled 
culture: the characters of ONAN are depicted as if ready to cast away their lives in favor 
of Incandenza’s film, where the very the characters’ deepest desires are answered by a 
film that causes total paralysis.  
 
The film ‘Infinite Jest’ is, then, an example of the trickster’s creativity par excellence. 
Incandenza has tinkered with different possibilities at portraying reality throughout his 
career, and stumbles upon something he becomes obsessed with. Joelle Van Dyne, the 
apologizing mother character in the film, recounts Incandenza’s attitude as follows: “He 
talked about making something quote too perfect. But as a joke. [...] When he talked 
about this thing as quote perfect entertainment, terminally compelling — it was always 
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ironic — he was having a sly little jab at me” (IJ 940). The film is Incandenza’s trick, 
his joke. Moreover, I find a strong similarity between Incandenza and the trickster since 
he is oblivious about what he has created himself, and commits suicide while working 
on the film. What implies the accidental effectiveness of the film is that Incandenza 
commits suicide right after completing it, thus becoming what Hynes (1997: 35) calls a 
trickster-tricked. Incandenza is depicted as having created something that stems from 
the very core of ONAN’s collective consciousness. The film is an object that can undo 
systemic/Symbolic structures, even if it is through a cycle of repeated viewings. 
Incandenza’s film, his ultimate trick, turns out to be so powerful he cannot survive it 
himself.  
 
Toward the end of the novel, the film is revealed as Incandenza’s final hope for a 
connection with Hal, which further emphasizes my claim that the trickster-father 
emerges as if from the ashes of the Father’s authority: 
 
[Incandenza’s goal was] [t]o concoct something the gifted boy [Hal] couldn’t 
simply master and move on from to a new plateau. Something the boy would love 
enough to induce him to open his mouth and come out — even if it was only to 
ask for more. Games hadn’t done it, professionals hadn’t done it, impersonation of 
professionals hadn’t done it. His last resort: entertainment. (IJ 838–839) 
 
After the Father’s prohibition has failed and language can no longer be used to restore 
it, as portrayed in the scene with Hal and the disguised Incandenza, all the father can do 
is resort to entertainment. The use of the word ‘concoction’ brings to mind Hynes’s 
(1997: 42) description of the trickster as a creative bricoleur who mixes a variety of 
sources in name of his mad and dangerous creativity. It is worth emphasizing that 
Incandenza’s medium is film and not literature, further distancing language from the 
trickster-father’s repertoire. The lethal film is, in the end, so entertaining for the very 
reason that it shows what existence was like before entrance into the Symbolic order – it 
gives visual access to the prohibited object of enjoyment. This indicates that 
entertainment is the only way for the Father to issue power, but, as was already implied 
in Incandenza’s using disguise, the power he issues is not that of the Father but of the 
superego. Incandenza’s declaration of wanting to entertain is the trickster-father’s 
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version of the superego command to enjoy. This gives another possible meaning for the 
repeated apologies Joelle is reported as performing in the film: it is also the Father 
apologizing for his inability to instill law, to successfully manage pleasure and keep the 
potentially all-consuming powers of the superego at a safe distance. Incandenza’s 
lethally compelling trickster-film should not, however, be seen as giving the prohibited 
object of enjoyment: what needs to be stressed is the repetition involved in it. 
 
The repetition included in the trickster-father’s film, both as its content and as the 
implied viewers’ compulsion to watch the film on loop, connects the trickster-father to 
the psychoanalytic concept of the death drive. What needs to be stressed about the film 
is that it produces enjoyment only through repetition. In this respect, ‘Infinite Jest’ 
shares the structure of the death drive: As Žižek (1999: 354, 360) explains, the death 
drive is the enjoyment produced by the repetitive circling around the unattainable lost 
object of desire, of repeatedly missing this object. Therefore, the film does not give free 
access to the prohibited enjoyment, but stages the very impossibility of attaining it; and 
the film does it so compellingly that the viewing is repeated until death. On the other 
hand, I see the name of film, ‘Infinite Jest’, as a further extension of the death drive: the 
film connotes the endless, painful search for a way to reach beyond law’s prohibition 
under an intensified superego who renders this search a duty, something imposed upon 
the novel’s characters. The enjoyment produced by the novel’s characters for repeatedly 
missing the goal of their desire, be it sobriety or success at tennis, corresponds with the 
“ ‘undead’ eternal life itself” that Žižek (2009: 62) uses to describe the death drive. 
What we find reflected in the novel’s characters, though especially in Hal and Gately, is 
not a repetition striving towards death, but a state of being caught in the death drive’s 
loop of eternally repeating the same, of an excess of life extending beyond boundaries 
the characters’ psyches can manage. The characters’ struggle is ultimately depicted as 
more terrifying than the film because there seems to be no end to this loop, no way to 
step out of it. I will return to the two characters’ connections to the death drive in the 
final subsection of this study.  
 
The film is, then, a symbol for the culture defined by its addictions and compulsion to 
repeat in that it shares the psychological pattern lying behind the pathologies depicted in 
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the novel. To put it differently, while none of the main characters in the novel see the 
lethal film, their lives are already structured according to the film’s logic: repeat, enjoy, 
repeat again. Incandenza’s film raises the question of whether it is feasible to direct 
one’s attention elsewhere from the passivizing enjoyment the film produces if the 
similar structure can be found in the pathological behavior that define the novel’s 
characters. This is, crucially, how the trickster-father turns the motif of imprisonment 
upside down: the trickster-father’s command to enjoy is so powerful it locks Hal and 
Gately in a loop they cannot escape. The trickster-father is, therefore, not imprisoned 
but the very agency of imprisonment. Hence, while Bassil-Morozow (2015: 7–8) sees 
the trickster as a metaphor for change, for the progressive potential of this chaotic 
agency, I argue that the trickster-father in Infinite Jest is a metaphor for the cage of 
pathological repetitions performed under his insatiable command to enjoy; the trickster-
father is the agency that feeds the death drive and keeps its prison-like loop in motion. 
This is how the emergence of the trickster-father forms the psychological background of 
Infinite Jest. As I show in the next section, the trickster-father’s presence is detectable 
in the repetitions that structure the obsessive ambitions of the young students at Enfield 
Tennis Academy, as well as the novel’s depiction of drug addiction and the process of 
quitting them. I will now present my analysis of the trickster-father’s effects on Hal 
Incandenza, Ortho Stice, and Don Gately, all of whom are taunted trickster-father’s 
imprisoning command to enjoy.  
 
 
4.2 The Psychic Effects of the Trickster-Father 
 
In this section, I inspect the characters Hal Incandenza and Don Gately in order to 
analyze the effects of the trickster-father’s injunction to enjoy. Gately, a recovering oral 
narcotics addict, struggles to remain sober by attending AA meetings and working as a 
staffer at the Ennet House recovery facility. I argue that Gately’s means of maintaining 
sobriety imply an attempt to evade the overpowering effects of the trickster-father, 
where AA’s central tenets function as substitutes for the law of the Father that has lost 
its structuring effect. I, however, begin with Hal Incandenza whom I argue is portrayed 
as striving to live up to the trickster-father’s command to enjoy. His ambition as a 
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promising tennis player and linguistic genius is taken to an extreme: his natural talent to 
master everything he does cannot ultimately be separated from the trickster-father’s 
injunction to enjoy, as I show in the following subsection. In relation to Hal, I also 
analyze one scene featuring the character Ortho Stice, one of the younger tennis players 
at ETA, who shows the horrific consequences of the pressure of the trickster-father’s 
command to enjoy. Furthermore, the focus in the following subsection is the way in 
which Hal and Ortho signify the trickster-father’s role as “superegoizing” the Imaginary 
ideal. I approach these phenomena as being generated by the trickster-father, meaning 
that these forms of behavior define the trickster-father as the figure behind Ragnarök, 
the godless state where no fixed meaning applies. 
 
 
4.2.1 Obeying the Trickster-Father 
 
What defines the young tennis players’ lives in Infinite Jest is ambition, but a self-
conscious ambition that has come to define their existence. The problem is formed out 
of the competitive culture in which the students’ energies are channeled into being the 
best, but that actually making it can prove detrimental. One of Enfield Tennis 
Academy’s prorectors encapsulates the predicament as follows:  
 
[if you] attain the goal and realize the shocking realization that attaining the goal 
does not complete or redeem you, does not make everything for your life “OK” as 
you are, in the culture, educated to assume it will do this, the goal. And then you 
face this fact that what you had thought would have meaning does not have the 
meaning when you get it, and you are impaled by shock. (IJ 680) 
 
The challenge with ambition the novel presents is, thus, dealing with the goal when it is 
attained, of having the wherewithal to face the fact that striving to reach the goal is not 
the same as reaching it. This corresponds with Žižek’s (1999: 351) theorization of 
desire, which connotes this type of striving for a goal that is never it. Moreover, I see 
the trickster-father’s injunction to enjoy as the force behind this obsessive striving for 
fame and success. The basis for this claim is the idea of the superegoization of the ideal 
ego, which means that the unattainable, idealized version of the self is one of the 
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superego’s guises. As I point out in the previous chapter, Žižek (1999: 451) sees the 
effects of this in that the superego’s injunction to enjoy is in contemporary societies 
channeled through Imaginary ideals of wealth, prosperity, beauty, and authenticity. In 
the case of tennis and Infinite Jest, the promise of athletic fame and success form the 
core of this ideal. Furthermore, this section aims to show that when this ideal is 
sustained by the trickster-father’s insatiable command to enjoy, the novel’s characters 
are forced to confront corners of their psyche that give us nightmarish glimpses into 
how the ideal ego threatens to consume them.  
 
The complications concerning this goal-oriented behavior, as well as the pathology 
involved in the process of attaining it, is portrayed in the novel through James 
Incandenza’s youngest son, Hal, who is portrayed as being an athletically and 
linguistically gifted 17-year-old:  
 
Hal Incandenza for a long time identified himself as a lexical prodigy who [...] 
had made his mother proud, plus a really good tennis player. Hal Incandenza is 
now being encouraged to identify himself as a late-blooming prodigy and possible 
genius at tennis who is on the verge of making every authority-figure in his world 
and beyond very proud indeed. (IJ 155)  
 
The narrator recounts how Hal’s sudden rise to the rank of second-best player at ETA, 
makes it necessary for identifying himself as someone who will impress people, who 
will be liked and respected for his achievements. This seems like a chance for Hal to 
live up to the tennis school’s ubiquitous ideal ego: the successful, talented, and perfect 
tennis genius. The staff at ETA are, however, aware of the risks involved: “Hal’s head, 
closely monitored by [the] Staff, is judged still level and focused and unswollen/-
bludgeoned by the sudden éclat and rise in general expectations. When asked how he’s 
doing with it all, Hal says Fine and thank you for asking” (IJ 155). Hal’s road to 
stardom seems to be without problems or threats; he seems mentally stable and gives no 
reason for concern. It is as if he has been able to come to terms with his ideal ego, and 
to manage the pressure of its unattainability. But as the novel gradually shows, beneath 
this surface Hal himself feels a gnawing emptiness.  
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Though Hal seems perfect in every way, the narrator dives deep into the character’s 
consciousness to reveal that 
 
Hal himself hasn’t had a bona fide intensity-of-interior-life-type emotion since he 
was tiny; he finds terms like joie and value to be like so many variables in rarified 
equations, and he can manipulate them well enough to satisfy everyone but 
himself that he’s in there, inside his own hull, as a human being [...] (IJ 694.) 
 
Hal, in fact, feels as if his self, his true ‘me’, is trapped, caged somewhere inside all the 
surfaces he manipulates to be accepted and liked by the Staff and his family. What 
makes Hal’s situation a harrowing dead end is that he is uncannily self-aware of his 
situation, of the trickster-father that imprisons him. He, in a way, recognizes the 
debilitating power of the trickster-father in stating that he can “satisfy everyone but 
himself” (IJ 694), suggesting that it is he, the ‘me’ under the façade, that inexplicably 
wants to be more than it already is, more than it can be. What also ties the passage to the 
trickster-father is the use of the term “himself”: while it might mean Hal, it can also 
denote Incandenza, whose nickname in the novel is, ironically, ‘Himself’. Thus, the 
trickster-father’s command to enjoy is embedded in the very core of Hal’s sense of self: 
the emptiness he feels stems from the insatiability of the trickster-father’s injunction to 
follow the ideal ego beyond law’s boundaries, beyond the borders of attainability. Hal 
may seem perfect, but he feels trapped within the ideal ego imposed by the trickster-
father, which is the root for his sense of emptiness and anxiety. 
 
Moreover, Incandenza’s motivations behind the film ‘Infinite Jest’ can be seen as linked 
to Hal’s need to strive for perfection. Besides being a questionable, even dangerous 
attempt to communicate with Hal, Incandenza’s film can also be seen as a challenge 
because he created the film as something Hal could not be able to master the moment he 
is exposed to it: 
 
[It was Incandenza’s goal to] [m]ake something so bloody compelling it would 
reverse thrust on a young self’s fall into the womb of solipsism, anhedonia, death 
in life. A magically entertaining toy to dangle at the infant still somewhere alive 
in the boy, to make its eyes light and toothless mouth open unconsciously, to 
laugh. To bring him ‘out of himself’, as they say. The womb could be used both 
ways. (IJ 839) 
51 
 
In another scene, the trickster-father appears to Gately as a wraith6 and explains that 
when Incandenza was “alive in the world of animate men, [he] had seen his own 
personal youngest offspring, a son, the one most like him, the one most marvelous and 
frightening to him, becoming a figurant, toward the end” (IJ 837). Incandenza seems to 
want to present Hal with different challenges as a way to ‘bring him out of himself’, of 
preventing Hal’s fading away, as if gradually transforming into a figurant, which 
denotes the extras in the periphery of a play or film. Incandenza’s film is an attempt to 
save, to introduce borders and challenge his son, but the entertainment his film produces 
is far from helpful: as I argue above, due to the disintegration of the Father’s ability to 
instill law, he can only issue the command to enjoy, which is what the film articulates. 
 
In Hal’s case, the trickster-father’s command to pursue the ideals of success and 
perfection is portrayed in his gradually losing control over his facial expressions. While 
watching an extracurricular match of a game called Eschaton7 early in the narrative, Hal 
must “feel at his own face to see whether he is wincing” (IJ 342). This need to feel 
whether he is wincing is a transitional moment for Hal: he has become alienated from 
himself by committing to the trickster-father’s command. Hal’s disintegration continues 
in a scene where ETA’s janitor informs him that “[y]our face is a hilarity-face. It’s 
working hilariously. At first it merely looked a-mused. Now it is open-ly cach-inated. 
You are almost doubled over. You can barely get your words out. You’re all but 
slapping your knee.” (IJ 875) And even after Hal tries to force a serious expression on 
his face, the janitor replies “Somewheres now between amused and cach-inated. Mirth-
ful, perhaps” (IJ 875–876). Close to the end of the novel’s narrative, though a year 
before the chronologically final scene that opens the novel, Hal is described as being 
completely disconnected from reality: “His face today had assumed various expressions 
ranging from distended hilarity to scrunched grimace, expressions that seemed 
unconnected to anything that was going on” (IJ 966).   
 
                                                 
6 The implications of Incandenza’s appearance as ‘the wraith’ will be returned to below. 
7 A complex war strategy game that uses lobbed tennis balls as metaphorical missiles. Played only by the 
youngest students at ETA, which is why Hal does not participate in it. 
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Hal’s loss of control of his expressions is linked in the novel to imagery that I see as 
evoking the Lacanian mirror stage. After the janitor is gone, Hal tries to see his 
expression in a window, but the sun is already coming up which makes him look 
“sketchy and faint... tentative and ghostly against all that blazing white” (IJ 876). This 
inability to finally see himself in the window’s reflection plays with the themes of 
alienation that the mirror stage introduces through misrecognizing with the specular 
image (see Lacan 2006 [1966]: 75–81). But for Hal, there is no image to identify. It is 
as if Hal’s commitment to the trickster-father’s command to follow the ideal ego has 
consumed him: despite his sense of emptiness, he has followed the trickster-father’s 
command to derive enjoyment by wearing the mask of his ideal self. Therefore, I claim 
that Hal’s inability to see his reflection signifies that his ideal ego has slid to the other 
side of the mirror, meaning that for Hal cannot make out his reflection because he has 
been consumed by this specular ideal itself: Hal has attained the unattainable, and his 
fate in the novel depicts its harrowing consequences. Hal has obeyed the trickster-
father’s command so fully that his “true self” has become buried under the idealized 
masks he can no longer control.  
 
At this point it needs to be pointed out that the trickster-father is not only the force that 
urges these characters to follow their desire: the trickster functions, rather, in the guise 
of the death drive, of the circulation around the goal that produces enjoyment and an 
excess in life (see Žižek 1999: 358). Hal embodies this paradox in that, as I show above, 
he has become his own ideal ego, he has subjectivized the unattainable, but he still 
circles around a truer self that has disappeared behind all the masks he has learned to 
manipulate. The next and final stage of Hal’s falling into the trickster-father’s loop, in 
the vortex of the superegoization of the Imaginary ideal, is portrayed in the scene that 
opens the novel, in which Hal is completely unable to reach out of himself: he is at the 
undivided mercy of the trickster-father. I return to this passage in the final section of 
this chapter, where the role of the death drive is ever more pronounced.  
 
The dead end of pathologically goal-oriented ambition is also symbolized by the face in 
a terrifying passage where Hal finds Ortho Stice, the best of the younger tennis players 
at ETA, sitting on a chair with his face frozen stuck on a window after having fallen 
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asleep against it with a sweaty forehead. The passage, which occurs while Hal loses 
control of his expressions, starts as merely comic, with lines that foreshadow what is to 
come: “His forehead had not once left the cold glass” (IJ 867). Stice then reveals what 
has happened: “It’s stuck is what it is. [...] Forgot the forehead was sweated up. 
Whammo. Kertwanged my own self. [...] I tried to pull her off her about 0230, and there 
was this fucking…sound.” (IJ 868–869). Ortho is stuck and cannot pull himself out. He 
himself articulates the point of the passage by saying that he stuck his “own self.” This 
scene is another depiction of the outcome of obeying the trickster-father’s command to 
follow one’s Imaginary ideal. What Ortho’s face getting stuck signifies is that he has 
become so obsessed with his ideal ego that he is, literally, stuck in it: the pressure of the 
trickster-father renders the reflective surface of the mirror into a trap Ortho falls into.  
The novel thus presents the mirror’s reflective surface as a trap, as a symbol for the 
imprisoning effects the trickster-father lays upon the characters’ sense of self. As I show 
above, Hal cannot identify with his “true self” because he has effectively become what 
the trickster-father commands, which makes him unable to see his reflection in the 
window. In Hal’s case, the outcome is withdrawal into the confines of the alienating 
masks, but this scene with Ortho shows that a strong devotion to the Imaginary ideal 
leads to horrific violence where the trickster-father’s urge to strive for perfection is 
strongly present.  
 
The scene with Ortho continues in a violent direction, which suggests that the novel’s 
characters are doomed to obey the trickster-father’s command. The passage is genuinely 
disturbing: 
 
There was a horrible sound. The skin of his forehead distended as we yanked his 
head back. It stretched and distended until a sort of shelf of stretched forehead-
flesh half a meter long extended from his head to the window. The sound was like 
some sort of elastic from hell. The dermis of Stice’s forehead was still stuck fast, 
but the abundant and loose flesh of Stice’s bulldog face had risen and gathered to 
stretch and connect his head to the window. (IJ 871) 
 
Later on, we find out that Ortho “looks like a piece of cheese pizza where somebody 
tore the cheese off” (IJ 909). What do these unusual and campy descriptions tell about 
the self? The passage shows the impossibility of living without the idealized masks that 
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have come to define these characters’ existence. They cannot escape the ideals that have 
come to dominate their lives: they are imprisoned by them. The trickster-father is the 
force at the core of how Hal and Orin relate to ambition and the process of striving for 
success. What strengthens my claim that the trickster-father is the agency behind this 
horrific, otherworldly event is that Incandenza is present as a ghost. Stice, before the 
attempt to pull him loose, asks Hal whether he believes in “[l]ittle kid shit. 
Telekiniption. Ghosts. Parabnormal shit.” (IJ 870) Stice’s terror here is underlined by 
the use of erroneous language. It is a reminder of the failure of language that the 
trickster-father symbolizes. The dialogue continues: “ ‘Somebody did come by before,’ 
he said. ‘There was somebody standing back there about maybe an hour back. But he 
just stood there. Then he went away. Or…it.’ A full-body shiver” (IJ 870). The 
presence is horrific and sends a shiver through Stice’s body as he narrates the 
happening. Hal responds in a way that helps to prove my point, as paranormality evokes 
memories of his father: “Himself allegedly used to see his father’s ghost on stairways 
sometimes, [...] and claimed I wasn’t speaking sometimes when I was sitting right there 
speaking to him. [...] So belief-wise I don’t know what to think” (IJ 870). Incandenza’s 
presence is, in other words, felt by both characters. He is a silent presence, looming over 
the moment of Ortho’s violently losing his sense of self. 
 
But Ragnarök is not depicted only as obeying the trickster-father’s command. Thus, in 
the next subsection I analyze how the novel represents the attempts at keeping the 
trickster-father’s all-consuming powers at bay. The attempts to evade the trickster-
father’s effects are most crucially portrayed through Don Gately’s and Hal Incandenza’s 
attempts at maintaining sobriety after quitting the use of drugs. I briefly noted that Hal’s 
metaphorical loss of self occurs after he is forced to quit marijuana, which implies that 
addiction recovery might be the ultimate challenge for Hal. This connects also with 
Incandenza’s film being something Hal cannot master: what proves most challenging to 
Hal is the very opposite of the addictive and repetitive structure of Incandenza’s 
terminally entertaining film. This emphasizes the ambiguity of the character: what he 
creates does not correspond to his motives.  
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4.2.2 Evading the Overpowering Command to Enjoy 
 
The novel presents Don Gately’s struggle with drug addiction as a way to fend off the 
trickster-father’s detrimental effects, which is a stark contrast to Hal’s downward spiral 
analyzed above. As Boswell (2003: 148) notes, Gately “must begin his spiritual journey 
at postmodernism’s zero point, where even modernism’s secular sacred has been 
exhausted.” In contrast to Gately, Boswell (2003: 149) calls Hal “postmodernism’s 
paralyzed prodigy”, who thinks he has learned how to manipulate his emotions but finds 
himself trapped behind this self-consciousness. From the theoretical point of view of 
this study, I see Hal’s paralysis stemming from the trickster-father’s command to enjoy, 
to follow the ideal ego to its darkest corners as I show above. On the other hand, I see 
Boswell’s articulation as corresponding with Gately’s journey through Ragnarök, which 
is the ‘zero point’ where all that is potentially sacred has been exhausted. Gately 
navigates through Ragnarök as an addict-in-recovery where the trickster-father’s 
temptation is framed and controlled by AA meetings and Blind Faith in the application 
of cliché’s and the undivided help of fellow addicts. The contrast between Gately and 
Hal becomes most pronounced once Hal tries to enter an addiction recovery group. I 
nonetheless begin this chapter by analyzing Gately’s struggles to remain sober.  
 
Gately feels the presence of the trickster-father as the looming urge to consume drugs, 
the temptation to enjoy. In relation to Gately’s struggles to remain sober, the narrator 
relates the following: 
 
your personal will is the web your Disease sits and spins in, still. The will you call 
your own ceased to be yours as of who knows how many Substance-drenched 
years ago. It’s now shot through with the spidered fibrosis of your Disease [...] 
You have to Starve The Spider: you have to surrender your will. (IJ 357) 
 
As trickster-father is an emblem for the injunction to enjoy, for the call to cross the 
border and take the drug, he is the Spider that Gately needs to starve in order to remain 
sober. The trickster-father is the cruel force inside Gately’s mind that keeps open the 
possibility for him to consume drugs again, to reenter the cage of enjoyment. Gately’s 
conscious will, that is, his reason, is in fact in the service of the trickster-father, always 
56 
 
ready to push Gately back into a comfortable high. This is how Infinite Jest presents the 
trickster-father’s hold as having become overpowering. As the law of the Father/the 
System fails to be in effect as maintaining coherence and structure for Gately and the 
other addicts of the novel, they need to find other substitutes for it, alternative ways for 
evading the trickster-father’s all-consuming powers. 
 
For Gately, the most vital element in Alcoholics Anonymous is the turning to a Higher 
Power, some type of god to whose power one submits. In AA, “[y]ou get to make up 
your own understanding of God or a Higher Power or Whom-/Whatever” (IJ 443). The 
point of this God is that it needs to be there, what it effectively is is of no importance. 
To heighten the arbitrariness of this belief in a vague God, Gately is  
 
suggested he keep his shoes and keys under the bed to help him remember to get 
on his knees. [...] He didn’t have any God or J.C.-background, and the knee-stuff 
seemed like the limpest kind of dickless pap, and he felt like a true hypocrite just 
going through the knee-motions that he went through faithfully every A.M. and 
P.M., without fail, motivated by a desire to get loaded so horrible that he found 
himself humbly praying for his head to just finally explode already and get it over 
with. (IJ 466)  
 
Moreover, what is noteworthy in this need for a Higher Power is that one does not have 
to know why one believes in it: uncertainty is a principal element in relying on this god. 
Gately “hits the knees in the A.M. and asks for Help and then hits the knees again at 
bedtime and says Thank You, whether he believes he’s talking to Anything/-body or 
not, and he somehow gets through the day clean” (IJ 443). The miracle of this vaguely 
constructed Higher Power is that it works: no matter what Gately really thinks about 
going through the motions, these routines keep the trickster-father at bay, even if one 
painful, drug-hungry moment at a time.  
 
In addition to submitting to the rule of some Higher Power, one needs Blind Faith in the 
older addicts and in clichéd slogans, which are the cornerstones of recovery from 
addiction and maintaining sobriety. These include, for instance, the following slogans: 
“Ask For Help and like Turn It Over, the loss and pain, to Keep Coming, show up, pray, 
Ask For Help”, “One Day At a Time!”, “Fake It Till You Make It” (IJ 273, 369). What 
57 
 
makes these tags relevant is that it is incredibly easy to merely sneer at them, but “that 
the clichéd directives are a lot more deep and hard to actually do. To try and live by 
instead of just say” (IJ 273). For the addicts in the novel, Gately among them, having 
faith in these banal, irritatingly superficial sentences is paramount, it is thorough a series 
of repetition without conscious thinking that enables sobriety. If too much conscious 
thought is put into these slogans, one is again following the voice of the trickster-father, 
who urges one to cross the boundaries, to transgress the Blind Faith in these cliché’s 
that miraculously keeps the trickster-father’s commands at a manageable distance. In 
relation to cliché’s and the vague Higher Power, what needs to be stressed is that the 
moment one follows one’s will, one is conforming to the trickster-father’s command. 
 
Addiction recovery is, then, depicted in Infinite Jest as a feasible way to fend off the 
trickster-father’s overpowering effects. Bassil-Morozow (2015: 82) shows that the 
system’s failure frees the trickster to taunt us, making us compelled to find alternative 
ways to structure his chaotic presence. Žižek (1999: 451) sketches a similar 
phenomenon by claiming that the law waning of law and the Father’s authority 
intensifies the superego injunction to enjoy, making us strive to find ways to ease the 
superego by finding new forms of submission. But is AA simply a new form of 
submission or can it be viewed as something else? If addiction is life at the complete 
mercy of the trickster-father, I argue that recovery, as it is portrayed in Infinite Jest, is 
about establishing the law of the Father that can potentially free from the uncontrolled 
whims of the superego. As I point out in chapter 3, Dean (2006: 146) maintains that 
“subjection to and liberation through the law are the same thing.” What is the crucial 
aspect in the novel’s depiction of AA is that it emphasizes the Blind Faith needed for 
the law of the Father to function. It is this faith in the law, faith in its liberating powers 
that needs to be restored; and one cannot turn to reason and will because they are 
infested with the trickster-father’s detrimental presence. Infinite Jest can thus be said to 
portray Žižek’s (2008 [1991]: 240–241; see also Dean 2006: 148) Lacanian reversal of 
the repressive law and liberating will: it is the novel’s characters’ will that conforms to 
the trickster-father’s command. 
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What is noteworthy about Gately’s addiction recovery is how it relates to the death 
drive. While AA is itself a loop, it is not sustained by transgressing border but 
establishing new ones. In other words, the death drive is emptied out of its enjoyment-
producing nature: the repetitions that Gately engages in have a structure similar to the 
death drive. However, instead of the disturbing excess of life that is sustained by the 
trickster-father’s command to enjoy, AA’s repetitions generate the ability to cherish the 
banality of life, of in fact finding the sense of having achieved something in living 
according to the simple slogans mentioned above. As the analysis with Hal shows, the 
trickster-father is an agency behind an urging to follow the Imaginary ideal beyond the 
final stage possible for the human psyche. What we see, then, in AA is a death drive 
that has managed to use the repetitious structure to transgress the command to enjoy. 
This makes the important point that the Gately and the other recovering addicts depicted 
in the novel seem to reject the trickster-father’s command to enjoy, they say “No!” to 
this obscene call. What is ironic is that it seems to work even under dictums such as 
“Fake it till you make it!” (IJ 369). The repetitive structure that defines the death drive 
is transformed in this collective attempt to navigate through Ragnarök. 
 
In contrast to Gately and AA, Hal Incandenza tries to escape the dead end of the 
trickster-father’s command by language and learning, or like he himself puts it: by 
“delivering the goods” (IJ 253). The roots of this are to be found in the way Hal is 
depicted as processing his father’s suicide, and especially the trauma of finding him 
dead. Hal recounts this to Orin in a very detached, ironic way: “I seemed to have been 
evincing shock and trauma throughout the whole funeral period. What I mostly recall is 
a great deal of quiet talk about my psychic well-being.” (IJ 251–252). Hal is then forced 
to attend grief- and trauma therapy, to which Hal relates as a challenge solvable by 
reading books, which does not work at first, giving rise to the fear that he might “flunk 
grief-therapy” (IJ 253–254). Hal’s need to perform and master thus extends even to his 
way of dealing with grief. Before long, he realizes that he has to think like a grief-
therapist, and not like a “student of grief” (IJ 254). In the following sessions, Hal uses 
what he has read in order to perform a successful grieving process, stating that he 
“finally delivered the goods and my traumatic grief was professionally pronounced 
uncovered and countenanced and processed [...]” (IJ 257). Hal uses his talent to learn 
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how to be cured. The superficiality of this learning is a part of Hal’s need to master 
everything, it is on the same level as his commitment to his ideal ego. This is also the 
case in a scene in which Hal is introduced to the sacrifices needed in order to be able to 
recover from addiction, which is to say, from the trickster-father’s command to enjoy.  
 
Hal’s first time in an addiction support group shows him the challenges included in any 
attempt to frame the trickster-father’s imprisoning authority. He enters Ennet House and 
asks for a schedule for meetings within the area (IJ 787). When he arrives at the 
meeting, he recognizes that one of the men is “pretty clearly the leader of the Meeting, 
possibly a high-ranking official of Narcotics Anonymous, whom Hal could casually 
approach about tracts and texts to buy and study, afterward” (IJ 800). To study and read 
his way through addiction is Hal’s strategy, which resonates with his process to master 
grief: Hal can therefore be seen as being afraid of “flunking” addiction, of failing to 
succumb to its effects. What makes the meeting uncomfortable for Hal is that he 
eventually realizes that participants are holding teddy bears in their lap and not talking 
about their addictions: he realizes he has come to an Inner Infant meeting where adults 
holding teddy bears have gathered together in search for ways to cope with unhappy, 
loveless childhoods (IJ 800, 804). It is the first time Hal has ever “seen projectile-
weeping” (IJ 806), which suggest the sentimentality that the occasion provokes. Hal’s 
reaction to these crying adults is to scroll “through an alphabetical list of the faraway 
places he’d rather be right now” (IJ 806), which indicates not only that he does not want 
to be at the meeting, but also that he withdraws into language, within the alphabetically 
organized list of words that signify escape. I show in the final section of this chapter 
how Hal’s withdrawal within the alphabetized list foreshadows his complete enclosure 
within the trickster-father’s loop.  
 
What the meeting and the final image ultimately reveals for Hal is how difficult it is to 
make the leap of faith required to keep the trickster-father’s effects away, no matter 
whether the trickster-father manifests itself as addiction or a loveless childhood. The 
scene at the meeting ends with one of the participants “down on all fours on a Dacronyl 
rug, crawling, hampered because one arm was holding his bear to his chest, so he sort of 
60 
 
dipped and rose as he crawled on three limbs [...] his face unspeakable” (IJ 808). This 
image connects quite literally to an earlier one in which Hal is described as musing that  
 
[w]hat passes for hip cynical transcendence of sentiment is really some kind of 
fear of being really human, since to be really human (at least as he conceptualizes 
it) is probably to be unavoidably sentimental and naïve and goo-prone and 
generally pathetic, is to be in some basic interior way forever infantile, some sort 
of not-quite-right-looking infant dragging itself anaclitically around the map, with 
big wet eyes, and froggy-soft skin, huge skull, gooey drool. (IJ 695) 
 
Hal’s theory of what being a human is like seems to be eerily played out in front of his 
eyes in the Inner Infant meeting. It is as if the horror Hal faces in the meeting is that of 
seeing his view of humanity realized and made concrete. The Inner Infant meeting 
confirms for Hal that human existence really might be sentimental, pathetic, and naïve. 
On the other hand, what makes this scene uncomfortable for Hal is that he cannot 
identify with this sense of humanity. As I show in the previous section, the way he 
solves the deadlock is by following the trickster-father’s authority, staying true to the 
ideal ego’s mask that lures with its destructive fascination. The participants of the Inner 
Infant meeting, like Gately with his struggle to remain sober, seem to refrain from 
covering up this hidden “truth” about humanity: they accept humanity as banal and 
sentimental, and by embracing this “truth” they are presented the possibility to evade 
the trickster-father’s cruel authority.  
 
In stark contrast to Don Gately’s relationship to language as characterized by Blind 
Faith in the AA system, Hal’s obsession with mastery and performance seep into his 
attempts at coming to terms with his father’s death. In Hal’s attempt to brave the loop 
ends up in a failure because he submits to the trickster-father’s command to enjoy, 
which in his case is extended to linguistic matter itself. In contrast to Gately, Hal 
masters language but has no faith in it, while the point of Gately’s relationship to 
language is that he has Blind Faith in its potential to redeem.  
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4.2.3 Enclosure in the Trickster-Father’s Loop 
 
My analysis of how the trickster-father’s imprisoning effects are portrayed in Infinite 
Jest can be separated into two categories, with Hal and Gately as their representatives. I 
argue above that Hal follows the trickster-father’s command by becoming the ideal ego. 
This paradox of Hal identifying with the unattainable ideal leads to a gradual 
disintegration of his sense of self, which is depicted in the novel as Hal losing control 
over his facial expressions. On the other hand, Gately and the AA community was 
found out to represent an attempt to evade the trickster-father’s effects by elevating an 
alternative way to frame the trickster-father’s overpowering presence, which I see as 
elevating a substitute for the collapsed Symbolic Father. I also point out the way the 
novel depicts this as impossible for Hal, who cannot turn away from his ideal ego and 
face his true self in all its banality. My analysis shows thus far that the trickster-father 
imprisons through his command to stay true to the ideal ego, but also that this obscene 
authority creates a “zero point” (Boswell 2003: 148) from which Gately can reconfigure 
his relationship to the world around him. This twofold distinction, and the contrast 
between Hal and Gately, seems to signify the predicament and ponder on a solution. But 
the trickster-father is detrimental to structures such as this on of condition and cure. 
This view stems from Levi-Strauss’ (1963: 224) observation that the trickster is a 
mediator between oppositional pairs. This is why the trickster-father does not leave its 
characters into a state of choosing between two options that oppose each other. Infinite 
Jest is not an optimistic novel, and the focus of this final subsection is to analyze Hal 
and Gately while they are enclosed in what I call the trickster-father’s loop.       
 
I see the trickster-father as a figure who imposes the need to resort to repetitive 
behavior: the trickster-father is the agency that sustains the imprisoning loop the novel’s 
characters fall into. The lethal film’s star, Joelle Van Dyne, ponders whether the lethal 
film Incandenza created was a “cage or really a door?” (IJ 230). Boswell (2003: 137) 
wittily points out that the film is, essentially, “a door to another cage.” In other words, 
the novel depicts a loop where escape from imprisonment leads into another prison. A 
similar conceptualization of the loop is to be found in the astute analysis by Mary K. 
Holland (2014), who argues that the novel presents addiction and addiction recovery as 
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a cycle that is maintained by a culture defined by narcissism; she goes so far in her 
analysis as claiming that “even earnest attempts to escape only lead back to new 
manifestations of the solipsistic loop” (Holland 2014: 77). Hal’s relation to his ideal ego 
is decidedly narcissistic, but the concept that defines the trickster-father is not 
narcissism but the obscene command to enjoy: the trickster-father urges the novel’s 
characters to cross boundaries that limit them, be it in the form of an ambitious striving 
for perfection or the use of drugs after sobriety. Nonetheless, Boswell’s and Holland’s 
insistence that attempts to escape the loop only lead into new forms of the loop is an 
important feature of the trickster-father as well. What my analysis shows is that the 
trickster-father’s loop is defined by the death drive, which Žižek (1999: 354–355) 
defines as the impossibility of ever getting completely rid of the pain of enjoyment, of a 
horrific excess of life that poses immortality and not death as the ultimate nightmare. 
The trickster-father presents itself as the agent of this terrifying immortality. 
 
Gately’s heroic success at maintaining sobriety is thwarted when he is shot in the right 
shoulder while heroically defending the most obnoxious of all the residents at Ennet 
House. What follows is that Gately wakes up lying on a hospital bed, in terrible pain. 
We learn that he suffers from toxemia due to an unclean bullet (IJ 815). Gately’s 
situation is summarized by the following blunt sentences: “Shot with a professionally 
modified .44 item. He’s post-trauma, in terrible pain, and everyone heard the guy say it: 
it was going to get worse, the pain” (IJ 888). The situation is unimaginably painful for 
Gately already because of the complications of the gunshot wound. But what makes 
these final pages of the novel so devastating is that Gately is continually offered oral 
narcotics to relieve this pain, but his ability to reject drugs by simply saying ‘No’ or 
‘I’m an addict’, have become compromised because he is intubated: “[t]he tube was 
probably why he could only mew and grunt” (IJ 858). These pages recounting Gately’s 
time tucked in the hospital bed are, in other words, a heartbreaking depiction of an 
addict trying to resist the urge to take the drug, to succumb to the nightmarish figures he 
confronts. For instance, a doctor appears beside him and offers the painkiller Talwin for 
his pain, which used to be “Gately’s #2 trusted standard when he was Out There [using 
drugs], which 120 mg. on an empty gut was like floating in oil the exact temperature as 
your body” (IJ 888). The mere “memory of consuming Talwin makes parts of his body 
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Gately didn’t know could drool drool” (IJ 888). Being deprived of language thus makes 
rejecting the drug a near-impossible task. It heightens the vital importance of simple 
declarations such as the ones I mentioned above. Furthermore, what these pages show is 
that Gately’s inability to speak is depicted as the root of his imprisonment, and therefore 
stemming from the obscene agency of the trickster-father.  
 
Gately’s state, his inability to convince the haunting figures that offer him drugs, is 
described by evoking imprisonment and entrapment, effects that I see as imposed upon 
him by the trickster-father. Gately himself ponders how maybe his addiction tries to 
alarm him to “be scared a medically necessary squirt would pull all his old triggers 
again, put him back in the cage” (IJ 888). Moreover, Gately ponders how  
 
[t]his is the only time he’s ever been struck dumb [...] and he doesn’t like it a bit, 
the being struck dumb. It’s like some combination of invisibility and being buried 
alive, in terms of the feeling. It’s like being strangled somewhere deeper inside 
you than your neck. (IJ 833) 
 
Unable to speak, he is given a notebook to write down things he wants to say; the 
narrator describes him as “inscribing an enormous vowel in the notebook with 
incredible care” (IJ 886), this vowel, an ‘A’ that stands for ‘Addict,’ is another way to 
try to keep clear of drugs. Later on, the promise of writing is frustrated since “[w]ithout 
a pencil and notebook he couldn’t even seem to get across a request for a notebook and 
pencil; it was like he was trapped inside his huge chattering head” (IJ 922). Gately’s 
inability to signify that he is an addict creates a horrific prison. Fearing the cage of 
addiction he might fall back into, he lies on the hospital bed and is confronted by fever-
infused, dreamy figures who try to administer him oral narcotics in some form or other. 
 
The most notable figure he confronts while lying in the hospital bed is Incandenza, the 
trickster-father himself, who appears as transformed into an entity referred to as the 
wraith. He is described as pirouetting himself inside Gately’s mind:  
 
into Gately’s personal mind, in Gately’s own brain-voice but with roaring and 
unwilled force, comes the term PIROUETTE, in caps, which term Gately knows 
for a fact he doesn’t have any idea what it means and no reason to be thinking it 
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with roaring force, so the sensation is not only creepy but somehow violating, a 
sort of lexical rape. (IJ 832) 
 
Here he is presented as an ambiguous presence, as something that cannot be confronted 
directly because he communicates, as it were, through Gately, but simultaneously to 
him. He even enunciates words through Gately that he does not know the meaning to. 
Incandenza thus introduces an alternative way for Gately to communicate, though this 
mode of conversing does not help him with the matter at hand, which is to remain sober. 
It actually intensifies his sense of imprisonment because he can now converse with 
someone though he cannot reach out: it is all happening within the confines of his mind.   
After the wraith’s appearance, Gately himself starts pondering what it implies to him as 
a person addicted to oral narcotics. He mentally observes that the wraith  
 
could be a sort of epyphanyish visitation from Gately’s personally confused 
understanding of God, A Higher Power or something, maybe sort of like the 
legendary Pulsing Blue Light that AA founder Bill W. historically saw during his 
last detox, that turned out to be God telling him how to stay sober via starting AA 
and Carrying The Message. (IJ 833)  
 
Gately sees the wraith as possibly a message from God that would miraculously 
strengthen his ability to stay sober. The wraith replies: “Don’t we both wish, young sir” 
(IJ 833). Gately then muses the opposite: “the wraith might represent the Sergeant at 
Arms, the Disease, exploiting the loose security of Gately’s fever-addled mind, getting 
ready to fuck with his motives and persuade him to accept Demerol [his drug of choice 
while still using] just once” (IJ 833). Gately then acknowledges the possibility that the 
wraith is an agent that encourages him to go on and accept the drugs offered to him. I 
see the wraith as a disguise for the trickster-father, to whom no boundaries apply, not 
even those of life and death. The trickster-father is the roaring force behind the 
nightmarish visions that Gately encounters; he is the psychological motivation behind 
the repetitive loop of tempting doses. Gately finally entertains the possibility that the 
wraith, meaning a ghost, might be “a message from a Higher Power about sobriety and 
death?” (IJ 833). I see the trickster-father’s appearance as the wraith as not testament to 
death but its opposite: the wraith being a dead person signifies that the trickster-father is 
a representative not of death but of the death drive.  
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Gately’s sensations are recounted as connecting pain with a repetitive loop, which 
evokes the concept of the death drive. As Gately lies in bed, he isolates each second in 
order to survive the pain of the gunshot wound: “Second. Second. He tried to Abide. No 
single second was past enduring” (IJ 890). The flowing of seconds that reproduce the 
near-unbearable pain makes him focus on how the pain is only a repetition of these 
painful seconds. The imagery of passing seconds is used in another scene to describe the 
sense of withdrawal he is forced to undergo in a jail cell: 
 
Withdrawing. Any one second: he remembered: the thought of feeling like he’d 
be feeling this second for 60 more of these seconds — he couldn’t deal. He could 
not fucking deal. He had to build a wall around each second just to take it. The 
whole first two weeks of it are telescoped in his memory down into like one 
second — less; the space between two heartbeats. A breath and a second, the 
pause and gather between each cramp. An endless Now stretching its gull-wings 
out on either side of his heartbeat. And he’d never before or since felt so 
excruciatingly alive. (IJ 859–860) 
 
It is as if Gately’s pain suggests not only the pain of the gunshot wound but also the 
pain of enjoyment the excessive pleasure in pain that is prohibited and maintained by 
law. The trickster-father’s intrusion, his “lexical rape,” creates the space in which 
Gately is forced to repeat each individual, overwhelming second, one at a time. This 
overwhelming pain Gately is forced to divide into individual repeated seconds resonates 
strongly with the death drive as being an excess of enjoyment derived through 
repetition. But a further observation by the narrator makes the crucial addition included 
in the Žižekian interpretation of the death drive: “He could do the dextral pain the same 
way: Abiding. No one single instant of it was unendurable. Here was a second right 
here: he endured it. What was undealable-with was the thought of all the instants all 
lined up and stretching ahead, glittering” (IJ 860). The enjoyment-filled seconds are 
fine, but the true horror lies in is that these seconds extend into infinity, never ending 
and keeping Gately unable to divide them into isolated moments of overwhelming pain. 
In this respect, Gately’s state in the hospital is an expression of the horror related to the 
death drive: the truly disturbing part is the pain stretching into eternity. 
 
66 
 
The sentence that ends the novel introduces the trickster-father’s loop on another level, 
which solidifies the novel’s portrayal of him as a prison. The final nightmare of the 
hospitalized Gately delineates the events of a catastrophic drug binge during which one 
of his friends is murdered and Gately is injected, against his will, with a potent variant 
of heroin (IJ 979–981). After the drug takes effect, Gately loses consciousness “[a]nd 
when he came back to, he was flat on his back on the beach in the freezing sand, and it 
was raining out of a low sky, and the tide was way out” (IJ 981). Gately finds himself 
on the beach, which is the location of his first dream at the hospital, in which he dreams 
of a time when “his mother had put them in a little beach house” (IJ 809), which 
suggests the trickster-father’s loop: not only is Gately not presented with redemption 
from the struggle to keep enjoyment/pain within manageable margins, the whole final 
section of the novel seems to start over. Despite being a metaphorical “way out”, it is 
also simultaneously a falling back in: the door is a door to another cage. This is the 
ultimate prison in which Gately has fallen, he is, as it were, forced to live and relive the 
painful excess of pleasure over and over again. He will be taunted by the trickster-
father’s guises in a recursive succession that suggests an extreme representation of the 
disturbing immortality of the death drive.    
 
Hal also ends up being caught in the trickster-father’s loop, though in his case the loop 
can be seen as a continuation of obeying the trickster-father’s command to enjoy. There 
is something deeply disturbing about Hal in the novel’s opening scene, which turns out 
to be the chronologically last one in the novel. Hal sits in front of an admissions board 
at the university of Arizona, and he has been told “not [to] attempt what would feel to 
me like a pleasant expression or smile” (IJ 3). This connects the novel’s opening scene 
with my argument that Hal becoming his ideal ego has led to a disintegration of his 
sense of self: he is ordered to remain neutral. The severity of Hal’s state is reveled when 
he starts to speak: “My application’s not bought. [...] I am not just a boy who plays 
tennis. I have an intricate history. Experiences and feelings. I’m complex. [...] I’m not a 
machine. […] I am not just a creātus, manufactured, conditioned, bred for a function” 
(IJ 11–12). Hal is trying to convince the admissions officers that there is more to him 
than his achievements, that he is a real human being behind the mask of talent and 
success, that is, his ideal ego. This reminds of Hal’s theorizations of the “true” self 
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buried under masks, the true self whose embodiment that he confronts at the Inner 
Infant meeting when one of the participants crawls sobbing on the floor.   
 
Hal’s dead end is ultimately the same as Gately’s: the loss of speech and the ability to 
communicate. After speaking, the admissions board is horrified at Hal, they offer him 
help, express terror (IJ 12). He is ultimately carried into the bathroom while the board 
members describe his speech as  
 
“Undescribable.” 
“Like an animal.” 
“Subanimalistic noises and sounds.” 
“Nor let’s not forget the gestures.” 
[...] 
“What were you possibly about, trying to enroll this —” (IJ 14) 
 
Hal is unable to communicate. He has become completely enclosed within his own 
consciousness, only eliciting horror from the people around him. This is the final stage 
of Hal’s commitment to his ideal ego: despite his attempt to convince people that he is 
something more than the impossible ideal he has become, he cannot reach out and 
converse. What complicates this is that Hal is unable to communicate, but, as the first-
person narrative implies and emphasizes, he is imprisoned within language: he keeps 
pointing out solecisms the other characters make, and even states that “[t]here are, by 
the O.E.D. VI’s count, nineteen nonarchaic synonyms for unresponsive, of which nine 
are Latinate and four Saxonic” (IJ 6, 17).  This is the issue I promised to return to in the 
beginning of this chapter, where I discuss Hal’s relation to language and Incandenza’s 
inability to hear him speak: Hal’s inability to communicate with the university staff 
reflects Incandenza’s inability to hear his son speak. It may be argued that Hal has 
become what his father claimed him to be. In other words, his enclosure within words 
can be seen as his final step in conforming to the trickster-father’s injunction. 
 
The death drive is applicable also to what happens to Hal: his enclosure inside the loop 
gives words, the infinite expansion of language. Holland (2014: 78) states that “Hal is 
doomed to the solipsistic death of his pathological society.” But a reading of Hal’s fall 
into the loop of the trickster-father is to say that he is not dead but doomed to live 
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forever the way he is presented in the opening scene: unable to communicate, unable to 
reach out, doomed to remain enclosed within his ideal ego. The same Žižekian inversion 
of the death drive is, thus, the case with Hal as well. Only in Hal’s case, the trickster-
father’s command to enjoy does not include pain-filled seconds that stretch into 
eternities, but letters that extend into words and sentences – even into the libraries the 
character claims to consume (IJ 12). Hal is, as Boswell (2003: 149) states with a nod to 
Tony Tanner, “trapped in a cage” one might call “the City of Words.” What connects 
Hal’s imprisonment within language to the death drive as signifying an excess of life, a 
painful eternity with no end, is the final sentence of the opening section. After he is 
dragged to the bathroom, an ambulance arrives to take him away, during which Hal 
envisions that once they get to the hospital, there “will be someone blue-collar and 
unlicensed [...] who will, looking down in the middle of some kind of bustled task, 
catch what he sees as my eye and ask So yo then man what’s your story?” (IJ: 17). If 
Gately is depicted as being caught in the loop of eternally repeating the painful, 
enjoyment-filled seconds at the hospital, Hal is shown as being forced to tell his story, 
to recount the events that led him into the trickster-father’s loop. Hal thus dissolves 
between the immortality of the letters, words, and structures that form the novel itself.  
 
Finally, the novel itself begins and ends with the characters at the complete mercy of 
Incandenza the trickster-father, which problematizes the idea of the trickster’s 
dissolution and creates the terms for the Ragnarök imposed by the trickster-father. As I 
show in chapter 2, Bassil-Morozow (2015: 23–24) holds that after the trickster has 
performed his tricks and changed the stale social situation he attacks, he is to return to 
his “dark wellspring”, implying that the trickster is not completely gone but absorbed by 
the system’s structures. But the trickster-father does not return to a “dark wellspring” in 
Infinite Jest, but persist as the horrific eternity of the command to enjoy that sustains the 
death drive. The Ragnarök imposed by the trickster-father is this terrifying infinite jest, 
the unimaginable eternity of Gately’s and Hal’s personal prisons of which the novel 
gives its readers a disturbing glimpse.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of my study has been to analyze how James Incandenza, the father character of 
Infinite Jest, portrays the agency I call the trickster-father. I conducted my study on two 
interlocking levels: firstly, I examined the ways in which Incandenza can be called the 
trickster-father by resorting to crucial trickster motifs and characteristics, as well as the 
psychoanalytic concept of superego. The trickster-father was found to be an 
imprisoning presence characterized by trickster features, which the trickster-father uses 
to taunt the characters around him. Most central of these was found to be his creation of 
the film ‘Infinite Jest’, which was found to function as an articulation of the trickster-
father’s command to enjoy. Secondly, I analyzed the different pathological conditions 
depicted in the novel, which I categorized in the following thematic subsections: 
obeying the trickster-father’s command, attempts at evading the trickster-father, and 
finally, the nightmarish state of being enclosed in the trickster-father’s loop.  
 
My study showed that the trickster-father is a relentless figure, making it problematic to 
find any kind of hope in challenging the ambiguous presence of this figure. The above 
pages delineate alternative ways in which the characters of the novel, most notably Hal 
and Gately, are imprisoned by the trickster-father. The trickster-father ultimately stands 
for an imprisoning superego command to enjoy that has acquired the operational mode 
of a trickster. I stated that the trickster-father is not a metaphor for change (Bassil-
Morozow 2015: 7–8), but a metaphor for the cage created by the trickster-father’s 
command, a cage I saw as sharing the logic of the Žižekian death drive. This has been 
identified as an outcome of the failure of the Father’s Symbolic authority that is 
supposed to give life its borders, and potentially liberate from the trickster-father’s 
obscene demands. My analysis shows that the novel portrays AA through Gately, as a 
potential way to fend off the trickster-father’s overpowering presence. Though the 
promise of the novel’s depiction of AA was questioned in the final subsection, in which 
I argue that the novel presents the speechless, enclosed-in-one’s-mind types of stages as 
Ragnarök. The Ragnarök in Infinite Jest was not found to be merely the acts of 
conforming to and fending off the trickster father, but also total paralysis, complete 
imprisonment in what I call the trickster-father’s loop. 
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As I already mentioned in the introduction, the foremost limitation of this study is that I 
do not take femininity into account. One could expand this study most obviously by 
considering the mother’s role in the psychoanalytic triad of child-father-mother. In this 
study, the maternal piece of the Oedipal matrix has been taken as a symbol for the 
prohibited enjoyment, something that needs to remain cast out of society in order for it 
to maintain itself. Some of the conclusions of this study could very well be elaborated 
on if one focuses on the abject maternal body, which is the content of Incandenza’s 
lethal film.  
 
Finally, one possible way to expand on this study is to look more closely at the 
trickster-father and his implications. As our present political, social, and cultural 
contexts become more and more disorienting, we might very well locate the obscene 
and the transgressive on the side of authority itself. Slavoj Žižek’s theories were used in 
this study because of this very insight that fills the pages of his works. On the other 
hand, I evoked Helena Bassil-Morozow’s conceptualization of the trickster for the very 
reason that whatever form of authority one might face today, be it the state, a social 
institution, a political party, or one’s own consciousness, one is bound to confront 
figures or impulses that function increasingly like the trickster. This also gives rise to a 
need to reevaluate the ways in which these novel forms of authority can be challenged. 
It is this change in how authority and power works during the Ragnarök we confront in 
our everyday lives that my analysis of the trickster-father is ultimately testament to.  
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